On a planet with a diameter of 12,700 km, a mass of 5.9 trillion (1 followed by 21 zeros) tons, moving at a speed of 107,000 km/h around the sun, an average human weighing 62 kg can feel very small. Yet humanity affects the composition of Earth's atmosphere and climate and mobilizes huge amounts of matter every year. Indeed, if the total mass of humanity (500 million tons) is insignificant, the mass of its infrastructure is far from it.

Greg de

On a planet with a diameter of 12,700 km, a mass of 5.9 trillion (1 followed by 21 zeros) tons, moving at a speed of 107,000 km/h around the sun, an <a href="https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-12-439">average human weighing 62 kg</a> can feel very small. Yet humanity affects the composition of <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/">Earth&#x27;s atmosphere and climate</a> and mobilizes huge amounts of matter every year. Indeed, if the total mass of humanity (500 million tons) is insignificant, the mass of its infrastructure is far from it.
<h1>A very heavy human infrastructure</h1>
The year 2020 marked the point where the anthropogenic mass exceeded the <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-3010-5">total mass of the biomass on Earth</a>. This anthropogenic mass is defined as the mass of all manufactured objects and includes metals, rocks, cement, wood, glass and plastic. The Earth biomass weight is estimated at about 1,100 billion tons (Gt). A figure already strongly affected by human activities since studies estimate that agriculture and deforestation <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25138">have divided by 2 the total mass of plants</a> present on Earth. The net primary productivity, i.e. the quantity of carbon fixed by photosynthesis that forms the biomass, is estimated at about <a href="https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/terrestrial-primary-production-fuel-for-life-17567411/">110 billion tons of carbon per year</a> (including the oceans). If we consider all the terrestrial biomass growing each year, the energy converted by photosynthesis corresponds to 5 times the primary energy consumed by humanity.
Adding the mass of all buildings and infrastructures built since 1900, the figure of 1,100 Gt was reached in 2020. This figure has typically doubled every 20 years since 1900. As for the breakdown, concrete (including sand) accounted for about 50% of the total, and metals for about 4%. For metals, the inventory is largely dominated by iron (the main constituent <a href="https://usbeketrica.com/fr/article/l-age-du-fer-n-est-pas-pres-de-s-arreter">of steel</a>) which accounts for 94% in mass of all extracted metals. These quantities are only a portion of the mass excavated and extracted to recover metals. For example, if a copper ore has a grade of 2%, producing one ton of copper requires extracting a mass 50 times higher. Taking this into account and not only the final amount of metals, the anthropogenic mass would have exceeded the total amount of biomass 45 years earlier. If these figures have a rather symbolic side, and their estimation is subject to strong uncertainties, they have the merit of highlighting our strong dependence on natural resources.
<h1>The economy is far from circular</h1>
The <a href="https://www.circularity-gap.world/">Circularity Gap Report</a> details the amount of materials entering the global economy annually. In 2017, this amount reached <a href="https://www.circularity-gap.world/2020">100 billion tons</a>-which represents about 13.4 tons per capita (with obviously very large disparities). 50% of this mass comes from minerals such as sand, clay, various rocks. Biomass represents about 25 billion tons which includes agricultural production and wood exploitation. For reference, the world production of cereals in 2018 was <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/agricultural-production">2.7 billion tons</a>. 15 billion tons of fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, oil) are used every year, mostly for energy. About 12% of the oil produced <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-petrochemicals">is used for chemicals</a>. Only 8.6% of the total is recycled, while the amount buried in landfills is 11.2 Gt.
The amount of material used is increasing at a rate <a href="https://www.resourcepanel.org/reports/global-resources-outlook">of about 3% per year</a>, and if the current trend continues it would reach <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MP7EhRU-N8n1S3zpzqlshNWxqFR2hznd/edit">177 Gt by 2044</a>. To put this exponential increase in perspective, China produces as <a href="https://www.revue-internationale.com/2021/05/chine-et-climat-passe-et-futur/">much cement (4.6 Gt) in 2 years</a> as the United States did in the entire 20th century. At the current rate, it takes only <a href="https://usbeketrica.com/fr/article/l-age-du-fer-n-est-pas-pres-de-s-arreter">16 years to produce as much</a> steel in the world as it did during the last century. This extraction has a high energy cost: about <a href="https://usbeketrica.com/fr/article/l-age-du-fer-n-est-pas-pres-de-s-arreter">10% of the world&#x27;s</a> energy consumption is dedicated resource extraction and processing, an amount that is bound to increase for metals <a href="https://www.decitre.fr/livres/matieres-premieres-et-energie-9781784054038.html">as ore grades decline</a>. The environmental impact is also high, particularly on <a href="https://www.resourcepanel.org/reports/global-resources-outlook">biodiversity and water reserves</a>.
<h1>A growing dependence on metals</h1>
This dependence is not likely to end, especially for metals. The decarbonization of energy infrastructures and transportation will require huge quantities of metals. The International Energy Agency predicts, for example, that the demand for metals for energy could increase by a factor of <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/mineral-requirements-for-clean-energy-transitions">2 to 4 by 2040</a>. This increase could reach a factor of 10 to 40 for metals such as lithium, which is needed for batteries. <a href="https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/24d5dfbb-a77a-4647-abcc-667867207f74/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf">Very large investments</a> will be necessary to meet the demand and to increase the extraction capacities. It is interesting to note, however, that if we consider the total amount of material excavated in the extraction of metals and fossil fuels, the energy transition will lead to a decrease in the total amount of material extracted for the energy and transportation sectors. A somewhat counterintuitive result, largely related to the huge amounts of fossil resources we use each year- <a href="https://qz.com/2113243/forty-percent-of-all-shipping-cargo-consists-of-fossil-fuels">by weight 40% of maritime trade</a> (around 11 billion tons per year in total) consists of fossil fuels…
<h1>Will there be enough metals for the energy transition?</h1>
The argument of humanity running out of the critical minerals required for the energy transition is often brought forward to demonstrate its impossibility. It is first important to define <a href="https://www.zenon.ngo/insights/fluxes-not-stocks-the-real-challenges-of-metallic-resources-for-the-energy-transition">things properly</a>: resources are the part of a geological stock whose exploitation is deemed potentially feasible – reserves are the part of it that can be exploited under current standards. Those are dynamic entities, which are not only defined in geological terms but also vary with the socio-economic context. If one takes the example of copper, since 1960 the ratio between known reserves and annual production has been <a href="https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/62b9fb2aad2275b3dcfe568b/62b9ff4827c9e079013d2493_6205268db9e6107724e7888d_Metal-single.pdf">between 25 and 40</a> i.e. that the reserves have increased as the consumption increased. This is true for lithium also whose reserves have <a href="https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2023">almost doubled since 2019</a>, and for many metals.
The problem of the critical minerals is not so much a problem of <a href="https://www.zenon.ngo/insights/fluxes-not-stocks-the-real-challenges-of-metallic-resources-for-the-energy-transition">stocks (resources) than a problem of flux</a> in a context of a strongly growing demand. Since the mining industry has relatively long lead times the risk in the next decade is that the production cannot keep up with demand. There is therefore a strong drive to reduce the future demand using strategies such as substitution (the changes in battery chemistry to reduce cobalt use is telling), material efficiency or recycling- the latter can only have a strong impact once the demand stabilizes.
One should also be aware that many technologies become more efficient (<a href="https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/ise/de/documents/publications/studies/Photovoltaics-Report.pdf">see the example of PV</a>) and long-term demand projections also depend on technology choices so different scenarios can show very different forecasts.
illuminem Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Sustainability &amp; Energy writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

Of Materials and Men

The IPCC published on April 4th the report of its group 3 dealing with potential solutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. Its message is clear : there is no time to waste to decarbonize our economy. In parallel, the war in Ukraine has shown the geopolitical difficulties associated with our over-reliance on fossil fuels. Will we finally see an acceleration of the energy transition ?

The IPCC published on April 4th the report of its group 3 dealing with potential solutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. Its message is clear : there is no time to waste to decarbonize our economy. In parallel, the war in Ukraine has shown the geopolitical difficulties associated with our over-reliance on fossil fuels. Will we finally see an acceleration of the energy transition ?
<h1>Carbon Budget: We need to act quickly </h1>
The <a href="https://unfccc.int/fr/processus-et-reunions/l-accord-de-paris/l-accord-de-paris">Paris Agreement</a>, signed in 2015, aims a limiting global warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels. Compared to the period 1850-1900, the Earth has already warmed by <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf">1.1 degrees</a>, and the level of warming is (at first order) directly proportional to the amount of CO2 into the atmosphere. That relationship implies that a given quantity of greenhouse gases may be emitted to stay below a certain level of warming- this is the concept of <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analyse-quel-budget-carbone-pour-limiter-le-rechauffement-climatique-a-1-virgule-5-degres-celcius">carbon budget</a>. At the end of 2019, that budget was about 420 billion tons of CO2 to stay below 1.5°C, and 1200 billion tons to stay below 2°C (with a 66% probability in both cases). But in 2019, global CO2 emissions were about <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/">45 billion tons</a>, and close to 59 billion tons equivalent CO2 if one considers all the greenhouse gases.
Staying below 1.5°C implies that emissions must start decreasing already now, and will be almost impossible if they have not peaked by 2025. Then it requires reaching net-zero globally by 2050. With the rebound of global emissions in 2021, after the temporary drop in 2020 caused by the pandemic, humanity consumed about <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43017-022-00285-w">9% of the remaining budget</a>. There is basically only 30 years to transform an energy system built over the last 200 years, with about 80% of our primary energy still supplied by fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal). The war in Ukraine has served as a reminder of this <a href="https://www.capital.fr/economie-politique/le-gaz-et-le-petrole-ne-sont-quune-facette-de-notre-extreme-dependance-energetique-1431000">massive dependency</a>- fossil fuels are responsible for almost <a href="https://essd.copernicus.org/preprints/essd-2021-386/essd-2021-386.pdf">75% of global CO2 emissions</a>. But will this war serve as a catalyst for the energy transition?
<h1>Yes: there is a favorable set of converging circumstances for an acceleration of the transition</h1>
Already before the war, the deployment of the technologies necessary to decarbonize our energy system was proceeding at a relatively strong pace. Over the period 2010-2015, the installed capacity for solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind power increased at about <a href="https://www.wri.org/insights/growth-renewable-energy-sector-explained">15% per year in average</a>. The world wind power capacity increased from <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-installed-wind-energy-capacity-gigawatts?country=ESP~IND~AUS~DEU~JPN~ITA~OWID_WRL">170 GW in 2010</a> to 740 GW in 2021. For PV, the evolution is even more impressive, the installed capacity went from <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/installed-solar-pv-capacity">40 GW in 2010 to 707 GW in 2021</a>. For the first time, in 2021, those two power sources produced slightly above <a href="https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/global-electricity-review-2022/">10% of the world electricity</a>, 1% more that in 2020 but, more importantly, their share doubled since 2015, the year of the COP21 and the Paris Agreement. More than <a href="https://www.pv-magazine.com/2022/02/01/bloombergnef-says-global-solar-will-cross-200-gw-mark-for-first-time-this-year-expects-lower-panel-prices/">200 GW</a> of solar PV are foreseen for installation in 2022. The cost of solar panels has decreased by <a href="https://www.irena.org/costs">more than 90%</a> since 2010, while the cost of batteries <a href="https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-prices-fall-to-an-average-of-132-kwh-but-rising-commodity-prices-start-to-bite/#:~:text=Innovation%20Forum-,Battery%20Pack%20Prices%20Fall%20to%20an%20Average%20of%20%24132%2FkWh,Commodity%20Prices%20Start%20to%20Bite&amp;text=Hong%20Kong%20and%20London%2C%20November,from%20%24140%2FkWh%20in%202020.">was divided by 5</a> between 2014 and 2020. Batteries are a key technology for electric vehicles, but also for electricity storage- which will become more important for a system with a high share of renewables. In California, the large majority of new PV projects are now coupled <a href="https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2022/03/11/californias-solar-market-is-now-a-battery-market/">PV panel/battery systems</a>.
Very quickly after the onset of the war in Ukraine, questions arose about the imports of oil and gas from Russia and how to decrease them or even get rid of them. The International Energy Agency (IAE) published two 10-point plans to decrease the Russian gas consumptions by <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/a-10-point-plan-to-reduce-the-european-unions-reliance-on-russian-natural-gas">one third</a>, and the oil consumption by 2.7 million barrels per day (to be compared with the total EU consumption of <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/a-10-point-plan-to-cut-oil-use">19 million barrels per day in 2019</a>) by the end of 2022. The EU announced in March a plan to lower the consumption of Russian gas by 2 thirds by the end of the year- an <a href="https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/the-eu-plan-to-reduce-russian-gas-imports-by-two-thirds-by-the-end-of-2022-practical-realities-and-implications/">extremely ambitious</a> claim given than 40% of the gas used in Europe comes from Russia. An embargo on Russian coal has already <a href="https://www.energymonitor.ai/sectors/power/with-its-russian-coal-ban-the-eu-blocks-a-fuel-it-wasnt-using-much">been enacted</a>. At the time of writing, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/04/business/eu-russia-oil-ban/index.html">a proposal to ban</a> Russian oil is under discussion, while discussions about an embargo on gas <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/14/world/europe/european-union-oil-embargo-russia-ukraine.html">are intensifying</a>. Although there are big plans and discussions about replacing part of that gas with LNG, it is not clear that <a href="https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/the-eu-plan-to-reduce-russian-gas-imports-by-two-thirds-by-the-end-of-2022-practical-realities-and-implications/">all the EU consumption</a> can be replaced, and certainly not so quickly. In parallel, the acceleration of <a href="https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/union-europeenne/la-guerre-en-ukraine-peut-elle-accelerer-la-transition-energetique-en-europe_5049505.html">renewables</a> deployment and a reduction in energy use (through efficiency or demand reduction) will both be necessary and will act to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. The price of the latter is in any case likely to <a href="https://rmi.org/how-putins-war-marks-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era/">remain elevated</a> for the foreseeable future, especially since many oil and gas companies have decided to stop their activities in Russia, which is very dependent on <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674247437">US technologies</a> in that field. Germany has increased its ambitions towards energy transition with an objective of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-present-renewable-energy-expansion-measures-2022-04-05/">80% of low-carbon</a> electricity by 2030.
Energy transition, climate change, energy independence, and prices, all seem to be playing in the direction of an acceleration of the move away from fossil fuels.
<h1>No: the inertia of our dependence is too large</h1>
Globally, CO2 emissions still <a href="https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg3/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FinalDraft_TechnicalSummary.pdf">have not started to decrease</a>, even if over the decade 2010-2019, the rate of increased (1.3% per year) was lower than during the 2000-2009 period (2.1% per year). If investments in upstream oil and gas are on a decline and their trajectory is more or less in line with a <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2021?utm_content=bufferb8725&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=twitter.com&amp;utm_campaign=buffer">trajectory compatible</a> with climate goals, investments in low-carbon alternatives are way too small. A <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-021-00863-0">recent study</a> showed that if solar PV and wind are deployed at paces of about 0.5-1% of the total installed capacity per year, this rate is much lower than what is required to stay below 1.5 degrees. The 2021 energy crisis and the war in Ukraine have also induced a strong rebound in the use of coal. Although coal use was on a slow decline since 2014-2015, electricity production from coal broke an all-time <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/cercle/a-quand-la-fin-du-charbon-1374351">record in 2021</a>. In February, discussions were ongoing in Italy about <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-25/italy-could-revive-coal-plants-to-break-russia-energy-dependence">re-opening coal</a> power plants. If the pipeline of new coal power plants has been <a href="https://www.lesechos.fr/idees-debats/cercle/a-quand-la-fin-du-charbon-1374351">decreasing</a> for the last few years, new plants are still being built and put in operation- although the majority of coal power plants should actually be closed by <a href="https://www.capital.fr/economie-politique/la-transition-energetique-necessite-le-remplacement-des-technologies-existantes-1429876">2030</a> in a 1.5 degrees scenario.
While renewables are economically competitive against coal in many countries, the strong increase in metal prices over the last 18 months may strongly affect the planning for new projects- not to mention the difficulties in the global logistics system. Metals account for <a href="https://www.iea.org/articles/what-is-the-impact-of-increasing-commodity-and-energy-prices-on-solar-pv-wind-and-biofuels">15% and 20%</a> of the costs of solar PV and wind, respectively. For batteries, metals used for the electrodes (lithium, cobalt, manganese) account for roughly <a href="https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/breaking-down-the-cost-of-an-ev-battery-cell/">half of the costs</a>. Cobalt prices doubled between January 2021 and 2022, while lithium prices were multiplied by 5. In parallel, the demand for metals will strongly increase over the next few years and tensions are foreseen on the marked because of too low investments <a href="https://www.zenon.ngo/report/fluxes-not-stocks-the-real-challenges-of-metallic-resources-for-the-energy-transition">in extraction capacities</a>.
Finally, just after the COVID crisis (which is still affecting many countries), many countries will be very sensitive to possible consequences of a fast transition on their economies. Germany, for example, has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/06/world/europe/germany-gas-russia-ukraine.html">repeatedly</a> brought forward multiple times the argument of the importance of gas to its economy to oppose possible import bans.
Acting to reduce emissions is getting ever more urgent. The war in Ukraine has placed the dependence on fossil fuels back into public debates, a place it should never have left because of the pressing climate change issues. If it is too soon to draw any conclusions at this stage, decarbonizing our economies is clearly advantageous at many levels, even beyond climate change itself.
 Energy Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Energy &amp; Sustainability writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

Will the war in Ukraine accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels?

The availability of abundant and relatively cheap fossil fuels, together with the development of technologies to extract and use them, are amongst the main factors behind the emergence of our industrial society. If many discussions evolve around the limits to economic growth, there is much less discussion about the ever-increasing energy consumption and its potential limit.

The availability of abundant and relatively cheap fossil fuels, together with the development of technologies to extract and use them, are amongst the <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/energy-and-civilization">main factors</a> behind the emergence of our industrial society. If many discussions evolve around the <a href="https://www.clubofrome.org/publication/the-limits-to-growth/">limits to economic growth</a>, there is much less discussion about the ever-increasing energy consumption and its potential limit.
<h1>An ever-increasing energy demand</h1>
The world total primary energy demand has increased by a factor 22 between 1850 and 2019, reaching about 630 exajoules (1 exajoule=1018 joules). An increase which accelerated during the 20th century with a multiplication of almost 6 between 1950 and 2019- with no sign of stabilization in sight. That increase is explained by the increase in the average per-capita demand and by the strong increase in population. The latter has been multiplied by about 6 during the period 1850-2019. The average energy consumption per capita was about <a href="https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html">71 GJ/yr/cap in 2019</a>, about 4 times higher than in 1850. But this number masks extremely large inequalities. For France, the per-capita energy demand is about 133 J/yr/cap, it is about 265 in the USA and close to 600 in Qatar. The latter is 46 times higher than the average for Africa…
Those inequalities are even more pronounced if one considers electricity, which on average accounts for about 20% of the final energy demand. In 2017, electricity consumption per capita was about <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/06/africa-climate-emissions-energy-renewable-gas-oil-coal/">140 kWh/yr</a> in Nigeria and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/06/africa-climate-emissions-energy-renewable-gas-oil-coal/">400</a> in Ghana. To put those numbers in perspective, a typical fridge in France uses about <a href="https://selectra.info/energie/guides/conso/appareils-electriques">350 kWh/yr</a>, the average electricity consumption per person being about 2200 kWh/cap. This means that inhabitants of those African countries use less electricity than a single appliance, which all households have got accustomed to in developed countries.
The availability of abundant energy has allowed a massive improvement of living standards in developed countries, as evidenced by the correlation, up to a point, between the human development index and the energy consumption per capita. The <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi">human development index</a> (HDI) is calculated based on the indicators related to health, education and standards of living (through the gross national income per capita). The HDI is strongly correlated to the primary energy demand per capita up to about 100-150 GJ/yr/cap. Above that, strong differences arise- France and the USA have a very similar HDI but vastly different energy demand per capita.
<h1>How does the energy demand evolve in developed countries?</h1>
A proper assessment of the energy consumption in different countries requires to consider the <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/energy-offshoring">energy footprint</a> which includes the direct energy use and the embodied energy used to make products that are then traded. A recent study made for 44 countries on the hidden energy flows embedded in trade found that the ten most developed countries used in average <a href="https://www.unsworks.unsw.edu.au/primo-explore/fulldisplay/unsworks_modsunsworks_72137/UNSWORKS">18.5 percent</a> more energy than measured through the domestic primary energy demand. The higher the GDP, the larger the share of trade in the energy footprint. The energy footprint of developed countries stagnates or even decreases since the beginning of the 2000s. France, the UK, the USA and Denmark being good examples. The energy footprint of the EU a decreased by about 10% between 2006 and 2014. This decrease can therefore not be attributed to offshoring. Developed countries seem to reach a maximum in their energy demand and in some cases a slow decrease. The level of that maximum depends strongly on the country: the USA and Canada (both oil producing countries) have much higher energy footprints per capita than the EU or Japan. If the trends are clear, the reasons behind are not totally elucidated: peak in the consumption of goods (the ‘peak stuff’ postulated by <a href="http://static.squarespace.com/static/545e40d0e4b054a6f8622bc9/t/54720c6ae4b06f326a8502f9/1416760426697/Peak_Stuff_17.10.11.pdf">Chris Goodall</a> in 2011 for the UK, which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/have-we-hit-peak-stuff-55728">contested</a>), <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335240939_Between_consumerism_and_deconsumption_Attitudes_of_young_Poles_as_a_challenge_for_marketers">deconsumption</a>, slowed down economic growth, …
The energy consumption of countries is strongly linked with its <a href="https://www.zenon.ngo/report/powering-the-world-how-much-energy-will-the-world-need">GDP up to a point</a>. It is clear that many countries will see their energy demand increase strongly in the coming years as they strive for economic development, and build the <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsta.2016.0368">required infrastructure</a>. In parallel, many scenarios foresee a decline in the energy demand in developed countries. The International Energy Agency in its ‘<a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050">Net Zero by 2050</a>’ scenario foresees that the total energy supply in 2050 (550 EJ) will be 7 percent lower than in 2020 despite significant increase in the global population and economic growth. This assumes strong improvements in the energy intensity of the GDP (twice higher than during the 2010-2020 period), gains in efficiency and behavioural changes. Since developing countries will see a strong increase in their energy demand, this implies a significant decrease in the energy demand in developed countries. And indeed, a <a href="https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC118592">recent report</a> from the EU Joint Research Centre reviewing a range of scenarios compatible with the EU ambitions to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 found that the energy demand has to decrease in all scenarios by 20-45 percent. A recent foresight report for France also foresees a decrease in final energy use of about 40% by 2050. Those trends, stabilization of the energy demand as economies mature, decreased energy consumption in developed countries, and increased energy needs in developing countries imply that the world energy demand could reach a maximum in a not-so-distant future.
The elephant in the room, however, is that, so far, the increase in energy use globally is largely an increase in the use of fossil fuels, which still account for about 80% of the world primary energy mix. Electricity production from coal has for instance reached a <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/coal-2021">record level in 2021</a> according to the IEA, and global coal consumption in 2022 could get back to its historic record of 2013-2014 to start declining only after 2024. This is in total contrast with what would be necessary to meet the climate objectives which have been re-affirmed at the COP26 in Glasgow. Transitioning away from fossil fuels will require that those countries can leapfrog their economic development by having direct access to cheap low-carbon energy.
Energy Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Energy &amp; Sustainability writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

Ever more energy, is sky the limit?

« Coal-fired power generation is set to reach an all-time high in 2021 ». This is what the International Energy Agency states in its ‘Coal 2021’ report, forecasting that electricity production from coal is expected to increase by 9% in 2021 compared to 2020. The Agency foresees that coal use in 2022 could equate its all-time high of 2013-2014 and stay there until 2024 before it starts declining. Just months after the release of the Working Group 1 contribution to the sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC, and the COP26 in Glasgow, this temporary resurgence of coal is all but good news for the climate.

<h1>How long is the coal era going to last?</h1>
« Coal-fired power generation is set to reach an all-time high in 2021 ». This is what the International Energy Agency states in its ‘Coal 2021’ report, forecasting that electricity production from coal is expected to increase by 9% in 2021 compared to 2020. The Agency foresees that coal use in 2022 could equate its all-time high of 2013-2014 and stay there until 2024 before it starts declining. Just months after the release of the Working Group 1 contribution to the sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC, and the COP26 in Glasgow, this temporary resurgence of coal is all but good news for the climate.
The energy source that made our industrial society possible in the 19th century is still at the heart of our energy system. In 2019, coal accounted for about 25% of the global primary energy demand and 37% for the global electricity production. While a country like France is about to close its last coal power plants, several developed countries are still very reliant on coal-fired electricity generation. It accounts for 19% of electricity in the USA, 23% in Germany and 29% in Japan.
<h1>What is coal ?</h1>
Coal is a sedimentary rock with a high carbon content formed by the decomposition of wood, plants and leaves under high temperatures and pressures. There are in fact different types of coal, which are classified according to their carbon content, their energy density - the amount of energy per kg - or their moisture content. These include high-carbon anthracite, hard coal, and brown coal. Lignite, with its relatively low energy density, is for example largely dominant in Germany- its energy density is hardly higher than that of dry wood, 18MJ/kg and 16MJ/kg, respectively.
Coal was already used in China 2,000 years ago. It was used for “industrial” applications in Belgium as early as the 12th century. But it was in England that it really took off: in 1700, that country was already using 3 million tons of coal, particularly for the iron and steel industry. Coal made it possible to exceed the limit posed by heavy deforestation due to the development of the iron and steel industry - an activity that consumed a great deal of charcoal - and by the demand for timber for construction - for carpentry and ships. It also marked a pivot from a flow economy, limited by the speed of growth of trees and biomass, to a stock economy based on the extraction of this material accumulated over millions of years. Interestingly, not everything started out well for coal, which met with strong opposition. In 1306, King Edward I of England banned the use of coal in the kingdom because of the smoke emitted by its combustion and the resulting deterioration in air quality.
<h1>An ever-increasing dependence</h1>
In 2020, the global coal production was almost 8 billion tons- more than a ton per inhabitant. Nearly half of the global production comes from China, while India is the second largest producer with about 800 million tons- about 5 times less than China. It is used mainly for electricity production (66%) and for steel production (12%)
Coal accounted for about 47% of the world&#x27;s primary energy in 1900, with biomass accounting for 50%. Although the 19th century is often seen as the century of coal, it was still largely dominated by the use of biomass - coal only reached parity with biomass towards the end of that century. While during the 20th century this share decreased, total coal production increased sixfold as the world primary energy demand increased. Coal&#x27;s share even increased at the beginning of the 21st century due to production in China, which tripled between 2000 and 2019, driven by an economy growing at nearly 10% per year. Between 2008 and 2016, China added between 40 and 60 GW of coal-fired power capacity each year - equivalent to the total capacity of France&#x27;s nuclear power plants (60 GW). Yet it is the energy source that emits the most CO2 per unit of power produced.
Transitioning away from coal, and more generally from fossil fuels, is a must to decrease CO2 emissions and limit climate change. In its Net-Zero by 2050 scenario, the IEA recalls that any new investment in unabated fossil fuel development goes against climate targets. Many countries, including China and the USA, have pledged to stop financing the construction of coal power plants overseas. This agreement did not include domestic developments or use. Indeed, over the period March 2020-March 2021, CO2 emissions from China were already 6% higher than in 2019 – mainly fuelled by strong increases in demands for energy and metallurgy. Recent estimates show that around 60% of oil and gas and 90% of coal must be left in the ground to have a chance to maintain global warming below 1.5 degrees.
<h1>Will we soon get rid of coal ?</h1>
In total, there are about 2,000 GW of coal-fired power generation capacity installed worldwide and about 500 GW under construction or planned. The rate of construction has tended to decline in recent years, as the use of coal is incompatible with climate commitments. Coal-fired power generation declined slightly (0.7%/year) over the period 2010-2018. Resources being plentiful, their exhaustion is not to be counted on to help move away from coal. Worse, the soaring gas prices, and energy crunch, have led some countries (like the UK) to re-open coal plants. The recent trend, and the magnitude of our dependance likely means that rather than an energy of the past, coal is likely to remain in our energy mix for quite some time.
Energy Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Energy &amp; Sustainability writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

How long is the coal era going to last?

Natural gas is often presented as a transitional energy for electricity production, with CO2 emissions well below those of coal. The term 'natural' also has a positive connotation for what remains a fossil fuel on which we are very dependent. Let's take a moment to decipher.

Natural gas is often presented as a transitional energy for electricity production, with CO2 emissions well below those of coal. The term &#x27;natural&#x27; also has a positive connotation for what remains a fossil fuel on which we are very dependent. Let&#x27;s take a moment to decipher.
The sharp rise in energy prices in recent months has put &quot;natural gas&quot; back in the spotlight and reminded us how dependent we are on fossil fuels. While coal represented only 2% of primary energy in 1800, its share peaked at 55% in 1910, and was still 25% in 2019. Coal, oil and gas still constituted more than 80% of our energy in 2020. The latter is the most recently deployed fossil fuel, accounting for only 5% of energy consumption after 1945, and is often presented as a &#x27;transition&#x27; fuel.
First of all, it is interesting to clarify why the word &#x27;natural&#x27; is almost systematically attached to the word gas. After all, we are not talking about natural oil. In 1792, a Scottish inventor, William Murdoch, developed a system for lighting his home with coal gas - formed from coal. This gas is produced for example during the manufacture of coke, a porous solid with a very high carbon content formed by heating coal to 1100 degrees in the absence of oxygen, which is used for the manufacture of steel. The ownership of the discovery of the properties of this gas remains uncertain. It enabled the significant development of artificial lighting. At the beginning of the 19th century, Paris and London installed coal gas lamps and a distribution network to illuminate their streets. However, at the end of the 19th century, gas was dethroned by electricity for lighting. It remained in use until the 1950s for domestic purposes, under the name of town gas.
The name &quot;natural gas&quot; was therefore used to distinguish it from coal gas. It is mainly composed of methane (CH4), between 85 and 95%, and of other volatile carbon compounds (ethane, propane, butane, etc.). Per unit of mass, it is the fossil fuel with the highest energy density: 55 MJ/kg against 42-47 MJ/kg for oil. However, as its name indicates, it is gaseous at ambient temperature and pressure, and therefore has a low energy density per unit volume. This means that it must be compressed or even liquefied for certain applications. It becomes liquid at a temperature of -161 ºC.
The term &#x27;natural&#x27; is not insignificant. A study published in 2021, and carried out in the United States, studied the reaction to different synonymous names for gas (&quot;natural&quot;, &quot;methane&quot;, &quot;fossil&quot;, &quot;shale&quot;). The term &quot;natural gas&quot; was perceived positively, while methane was perceived very negatively. The term natural was associated with &quot;clean&quot; while methane was associated with &quot;pollution&quot;. Interestingly, reactions to the terms &quot;fossil&quot; and &quot;shale&quot; were strongly dependent on political orientation - Republican participants were more positive towards these terms. Given these results, the fact that gas is a highly CO2 emitting fossil fuel, and that coal gas is no longer used, the word natural should no longer be used to describe it.
This is particularly important as gas plays an important role in the decarbonization of energy, hence its qualification as a transition fuel. Although its combustion emits CO2, it emits 2 times less per kWh produced than coal, and nearly 3 times less for a combined cycle power plant. Thus, the replacement of many coal-fired power plants by gas-fired plants in the USA between 2005 and 2018, mainly motivated by the very low price of gas, has reduced CO2 emissions from electricity production by 27%. Over this period, the share of coal in electricity was divided by 2.6 while the share of gas doubled.
But methane is itself a gas with a very powerful greenhouse effect. Its warming power is about 30 times greater for a period of 100 years, and 85 times greater for a period of 20 years - methane progressively degrades in the atmosphere. Releasing methane into the atmosphere is therefore much worse in the short and medium term than CO2. So-called fugitive emissions are defined as emissions produced unintentionally and include leaks from industrial facilities and pipelines. In 2015, they represented the equivalent of 2.3% of US gas production, greatly diminishing the interest of switching to gas from a climate point of view. However, these emissions can be greatly reduced by at least 40% at no additional cost. During the COP26, more than 100 countries committed to reduce their methane emissions by 30% by 2030.
About 40% of the gas imported into Europe comes from Russia, far ahead of Norway (18.5%) and Algeria (11.3%). Consumption increased by 35% between 1990 and 2018. About 20% of the electricity in Europe is produced in gas-fired power plants. These have very interesting qualities for electricity production. They can start up in a few minutes and are able to vary their power very quickly, which makes them ideal complements for variable energy sources such as solar and wind, while waiting for the development of biogas and storage facilities on a larger scale. This high flexibility means that gas-fired power plants in Europe are often used to maintain the balance of the electricity grid. As the price of electricity on the markets is determined by the marginal means of production, the recent sharp rise in the price of gas has had a strong impact on electricity prices in Europe.
If the replacement of coal by fossil gas has an interest in lowering emissions, subject to the control of fugitive emissions, its use can only be limited in time. As recently reminded, nearly 60% of the gas reserves must remain unused to stay under the 1.5 degrees of warming...
Energy Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Energy &amp; Sustainability writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

Natural gas: what does it mean for the climate?

Nuclear fusion has long been thought of as the energy of the future – an “infinite” source of power that does not rely on the need to burn carbon. But after decades of research, it has yet to deliver on its exciting promise.

How much closer does this new breakthrough bring us to the desired results? Here is a brief overview to put this new scientific advance into perspective.

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory <a href="https://www.llnl.gov/news/national-ignition-facility-experiment-puts-researchers-threshold-fusion-ignition">has announced</a> a major breakthrough in nuclear fusion, using powerful lasers to produce 1.3 megajoules of energy – about 3% of the energy contained in 1kg of crude oil.
Nuclear fusion has long been thought of as the energy of the future – an “infinite” source of power that does not rely on the need to burn carbon. But after decades of research, it has yet to deliver on its exciting promise.
How much closer does this new breakthrough bring us to the desired results? Here is a brief overview to put this new scientific advance into perspective.
<h2>What is nuclear fusion?</h2>
There are two ways of using nuclear energy: fission, which is used in current nuclear power plants, and fusion.
In fission, heavy uranium atoms are broken into smaller atoms to release energy. Nuclear fusion is the opposite process: light atoms are transformed into heavier atoms to release energy, the same process that occurs within the plasma core of the Sun.
A fusion reactor amplifies power: the reaction triggered must produce more energy than is needed to heat up the fuel plasma for energy production to occur – this is known as ignition. No one has managed this yet. The current record was achieved in 1997 by the Joint European Torus in the UK, where <a href="https://www.euro-fusion.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Archive/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/jeteuropeansucess.pdf">16 megawatts of power were generated</a> by magnetic fusion, but it took 23 megawatts to trigger it.
<img src="https://illuminem.b-cdn.net/articlebody/377c5cf091827a6d2ebc562a51cd8d3a863b8c01.png" alt="Figure 1: Inside the fusion chamber of the DIII-D tokamak, San Diego, USA. Rswilcox, CC BY-SA">
There are two possible ways of achieving nuclear fusion: magnetic confinement, which uses powerful magnets to confine the plasma for very long periods of time, and inertial confinement, which uses very powerful and brief laser pulses to compress the fuel and start the fusion reaction.
Historically, magnetic fusion has been favoured because the technology needed for inertial fusion, particularly the lasers, was not available. Inertial fusion also requires much higher gains to compensate for the energy consumed by the lasers.
<h2>Inertial confinement</h2>
The two largest inertial projects are the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the USA and the <a href="http://www-lmj.cea.fr/">Laser MégaJoule</a> in France, whose applications are mainly military and funded by defence programmes. Both facilities simulate nuclear explosions for research purposes, though the NIF also carries out research on energy.
The NIF uses 192 laser beams that produce a total of 1.9 megajoules of energy for a period lasting a few nanoseconds to trigger the fusion reaction. Fuel is placed inside a metal capsule a few millimetres across, which, when heated by lasers, emits X-rays that heat up and compress the fuel.
It was this process that, on 8 August 2021, achieved the landmark energy production of <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2021/08/explosive-new-result-laser-powered-fusion-effort-nears-ignition">1.3 megajoules</a>, the highest value ever recorded by the inertial approach: that is, the closest we have come to ignition.
The overall gain of 0.7 equals the record achieved by JET in 1997 using magnetic confinement, but in this case, the fuel absorbed 0.25 megajoules of energy and generated 1.3 megajoules: fusion therefore generated a good part of the heat needed for the reaction, approaching the point of ignition.
Still, a reactor will have to achieve much higher gains (more than 100) to be economically attractive.
<h2>Magnetic confinement</h2>
The magnetic confinement approach promises better development prospects and is thus the preferred route for energy production so far.
The vast majority of research focuses on <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tokamak">tokamaks</a>, fusion reactors invented in the USSR in the 1960s, where the plasma is confined by a strong magnetic field.
<a href="https://www.iter.org/fr/accueil">ITER</a>, a demonstration reactor under construction in the south of France involving 35 countries, uses the tokamak configuration. It will be the world’s largest fusion reactor, and aims to demonstrate a gain of 10 – the plasma will be heated by 50 megawatts of power and should generate 500 megawatts. The first plasma is now officially expected by the end of 2025, with a demonstration of fusion expected in the late 2030s.
The UK has recently launched the STEP project (<a href="https://step.ukaea.uk/">Spherical Tokamak for Electricity Production</a>), which aims to develop a reactor that connects to the energy grid in the 2040s. China is also pursuing an <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1741-4326/aa686a/pdf">ambitious programme</a> to produce tritium isotopes and electricity in the 2040s. Finally, Europe plans to open another <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0920379618302898">tokamak demonstrator</a>, DEMO, in the 2050s.
Another configuration called the stellarator, like Germany’s <a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wendelstein_7-X">Wendelstein-7X</a>, is showing very good results. Though stellarator performances are lower than what a tokamak can achieve, its intrinsic stability and promising recent results make it a serious alternative.
<h2>The future of fusion</h2>
Meanwhile, private nuclear fusion projects have been booming in recent years. Most of them envision a fusion reaction in the next ten to 20 years and together have attracted <a href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/nuclear-fusion-the-ultimate-deep-tech-now-attracts-billions-in-private-funding/">US$2 billion in funding</a> to outpace the traditional development sector.
<img src="https://illuminem.b-cdn.net/articlebody/6fb541d298d8654e65aa9b0e083e9d4a47b22eb7.png" alt="Two different nuclear fusion deployment scenarios, compared with wind, solar and nuclear fission. G. De Temmerman, D. Chuard, J.-B. Rudelle for Zenon Research, Author provided">
While these initiatives use other innovative technologies to reach fusion and could thus very well deliver operational reactors fast, deploying a fleet of reactors throughout the world is bound to take time.
If development follows this accelerated track, nuclear fusion could amount for about 1% global energy demand by 2060.
So while this new breakthrough is exciting, it’s worth keeping in mind that fusion will be an energy source for the second part of the century – at the earliest.
This article also appeared on <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-what-do-new-results-mean-for-the-future-of-infinite-energy-166456?utm_source=linkedin&amp;utm_medium=bylinelinkedinbutton">The Conversation</a>. Energy Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Energy &amp; Sustainability writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

Nuclear fusion breakthrough: what do new results mean for the future of ‘infinite’ energy?

Let’s start with a paradox. The planet we’re living on, Earth, since terraforming and colonising Mars is currently not possible, is slowing down. 500 million years ago, a day was 22 hours long. Given that the change is about a millisecond per century, it is very unlikely that any of us will feel that effect. It is, however, all the more surprising if one considers the evolution of human activity and the fact that things seem to always go faster. And indeed, the ‘Great Acceleration’ is the expression used to describe the spectacular development since the 1950s, of the world economy, population, energy demand, trade, and… of the human impact on the environment.

Let’s start with a paradox. The planet we’re living on, Earth, since terraforming and colonising Mars is <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/goddard/2018/mars-terraforming">currently not possible</a>, is <a href="https://www.discovermagazine.com/planet-earth/the-earths-rotation-is-gradually-slowing-down">slowing down</a>. 500 million years ago, a day was 22 hours long. Given that the change is about a millisecond per century, it is very unlikely that any of us will feel that effect. It is, however, all the more surprising if one considers the evolution of human activity and the fact that things seem to always go faster. And indeed, the ‘Great Acceleration’ is the expression used to describe the spectacular development since the 1950s, of the world economy, population, energy demand, trade, and… of the human impact on the environment.
<h1>Lightning speed of information</h1>
What better example than the flow of information to characterise the speed at which things can go in our modern world?
All major media continuously diffuse information and news on their website. A study made with data from 2013 which analysed 2.5 million news articles, showed that in average it took 175 minutes for a piece of news appearing on one website for the first time to be repeated on another news channel. For a quarter of those events, the time was less than 4 minutes! Somewhat ironically, fake news actually diffuse much faster than real information. On Twitter for example, studies show that fake information propagates 10 to 20 times faster than a real news. On financial markets, reaction times for high frequency trading are of the order of milliseconds.
In very different fields, the Covid-19 virus propagated throughout the whole world in hardly a few months after its discovery in humans. Things which appeared impossible have been realised on very short timescales. 8 years elapsed between John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s speech announcing, in 1961, the decision to land a man on the Moon and Neil Armstrong’s first step on our satellite in 1969.
<h1>Adoption speed of new technologies</h1>
The speed at which certain technologies are adopted can also make one dizzy. In 2000, there were about 730 million mobile phones in the world. 16 years later, there are about 7.4 billion, as many as there are inhabitants. This of course does not mean that every inhabitant has got one – many people own at least two. Over the same period, the fraction of American households owning a tablet went from 3 to 64%. The pace at which new objects are released is also breathtaking. Mobile phone manufacturers update their flagship model every year. The number of pixels on smartphone cameras has been multiplied by 35 in 10 years, and the trend is now the multiplication of camera sensors themselves.
But nothing beats Moore’s law, postulated on the basis of empirical observations by Intel’s co-founder in 1965 and revised 10 years later. It states that the number of transistors on a microchip doubles every 2 years- an annual growth rate of 41%. A growth rate which has been maintained over almost 50 years, resulting in a multiplication factor of 25 million!
<h1>Energy transition: fast and easy?</h1>
From the above figures, the total transformation of our energy system might seem possible in a fast fashion. This energy system is still currently based for 80% on fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) that we consume at a rate of about 15 billion tons per year (2019 number). As stated in the recent <a href="https://illuminem.com/post/be8a8429-fddb-41a0-badb-16b4856b2939">IPPCC report</a>, the remaining carbon dioxide budget to have a reasonable change to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees is about 460 billion tons- while our annual emissions are about 40 billion tons. The budget gets larger if one considers 2 degrees as a target, with all the dire consequences it implies. A drastic reduction of our emissions is in any case required within the next 30 years – a reduction which has yet to start.
It is true that in their phase of exponential growth, energy technologies such as nuclear, wind or solar photovoltaic grew at about 25-40% per year. For nuclear, that growth has stopped rather abruptly towards the end of the 1980s. In 2019, nuclear accounted for about 4% of the world energy demand (10% electricity). Although nuclear has very beneficial advantages to decarbonise electricity production, it is currently hard to see signs of a coming renaissance – but some countries seem to be changing their mind. Wind and solar represent 1 and 2% of our primary energy. A recent study done across 60 countries showed that wind and solar typically deploy at a rate between 0.8 and 1.8% of the total installed capacity per year. While this is fast, it is not fast enough to be compatible with most envisaged net-zero scenarios. In addition, many countries tend to observe a slowdown of renewable deployment rates despite the relatively low penetration in the electricity system.
Finally, in the energy world, contrary to what happens for mobile phones, infrastructures and power plants require significant investments (of the order of 1 billion euro per GW for coal) and they are designed to operate for a long time. Closing power plants earlier than anticipated potentially represent a significant cost. A country building coal power plants in 2021, and about 500GW of new coal capacity is being considered, will certainly not close them in 2025. By its size, our energy system – the world primary energy demand is about 160 000 TWh- is therefore much closer from a giant container-ship than a jet-ski…
Energy Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Energy &amp; Sustainability writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

Everything moves fast, and yet not nearly fast enough…

Because of its speed and magnitude, climate change could have serious adverse effects, such as excessively high humidity and temperature making large regions on Earth uninhabitable, sea-level rise, more frequent and extreme weather events, and large reductions in biodiversity. While all these effects will certainly have an impact on human societies in one way or another, there is no consensus on what the implications on the world economy will be. 

<h1>A climate limit to economic growth</h1>
June 30th, the city of Lytton in western Canada broke the record of the highest temperature ever seen in the country: 49,5°C. A record which had already been broken twice in the preceding days with 46,6 et 47,5°C, respectively. The heat wave which struck the northwestern part of the USA and Canada was then followed by massive wildfires. At the same time, Finland had its hottest month of June. Those events would have been impossible in the absence of global warming caused by the massive release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere by human activities. In 2018, global emissions amounted to 58 billion tons of CO2 equivalent.
Because of its speed and magnitude, climate change could have serious adverse effects, such as excessively high humidity and temperature making large regions on Earth uninhabitable, sea-level rise, more frequent and extreme weather events, and large reductions in biodiversity. It is important to remember that the average global temperature is already 1.2°C higher today than what it was during the preindustrial era, and that current national pledges, assuming they are fulfilled, will induce a warming of at least 2.4°C by the end of the century.
<h1>Consequences on the world economy are hard to estimate</h1>
While all these effects will certainly have an impact on human societies in one way or another, there is no consensus on what the implications on the world economy will be. To try and estimate those effects, so-called “integrated” models combine an economic framework with a description of the climate evolution: economic activities produce greenhouse gases that affect the global climate, which in turn affects the economy. The most famous of such models was developed by William Nordhaus, the 2018 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science.
They are meant to provide policy-makers with quantitative arguments from cost-benefit analyses of the effect of climate change on the economy, notably to determine what is known as the social cost of carbon. It evaluates the cost, in dollars, of economic damages caused by the emission of one ton of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and consequently the benefits expected from investment in emission reduction.
The economic impact of global warming is typically described by the response of the Global Domestic Product (GDP) to a climate variable, usually the average global surface temperature change. Several methods exist to estimate this response, in most cases by extrapolating from effects already observed in past decades. Very different extrapolations have been proposed giving strongly differing results for a given level of warming. For example, for a 4°C warming some estimates foresee a global GDP a few percent lower than its expected value without climate change while other models estimate that the GDP will be halved. For 8°C, the most optimistic models foresee an impact of hardly 10% while large regions of the world will become uninhabitable. Such low damage levels are used by climate-deniers to claim that the cost of climate actions is not justified, and that humanity should rather focus on more pressing issues.
<h1>A possible climate limit to growth</h1>
Most models consider that economic growth will continue, whatever the level of warming. Recent studies have started looking at the possible impact of global warming on economic growth. Our think tank, Zenon Research, recently published <a href="https://illuminem.com/post/6f59f513-55ab-489e-878a-96b959faf542">a repor</a>t following this path. It shows that economic growth is slowed down by climate change, to the point that it may cause a structural economic recession. This ‘climate limit’ to economic growth is linked to the existence of climatic tipping points. Once reached, damage on growth suddenly increases so that recession occurs shortly afterwards. Breakpoints are found between 3°C to 5°C, depending on the assumptions.
These results could lead one to think that a warming of a few degrees is acceptable. But our results show that already at +2°C, the global economic growth rate is divided by 2. Consequently, the need to maintain economic growth, for example to finance ambitious energy transition plans, must lead us to act strongly and swiftly to limit climate change. Indeed, if economic growth were to be durably affected by climate damage, one can expect that the immense challenge we are facing will become even more difficult to tackle.
This article is an introduction to the report &quot;Too Hot to Grow:How global warming can make the world enter into structural economic recession&quot;, of Zenon Research, co-authored by: 
Dimitri Chuard, Jean-Baptiste Rudelle and Greg de Temmerman.
To read the full report, please click <a href="https://illuminem.com/post/6f59f513-55ab-489e-878a-96b959faf542">here.</a>​ 
Energy Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Energy &amp; Sustainability writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.

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Greg de Temmerman

Greg de Temmerman

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