The tectonic shift: Sovereignty, sustainability, and the developmental promise of the Sahel States

I. Executive summary and strategic implications

In September 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formally formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) under the Liptako-Gourma Charter. This is a significant structural departure from decades of post-colonial alignment in West Africa. A dedication to "Decolonial Alignment" and the pursuit of radical sovereignty in security, economic policy, and monetary affairs define this collective, which came together after a series of military takeovers between 2020 and 2023.

The failure of conventional, Western-backed security frameworks to contain the growing terrorist insurgency (with fatalities reaching a record high of 7,620 in the first half of 2024) and widespread public discontent with Western, especially French, influence — a phenomenon sometimes derisively referred to as Françafrique — were the two crises that gave rise to the AES. Establishing financial autonomy through organisations like the Confederal Bank for Investment and Development (CBID) and attaining monetary independence by opposing the CFA franc constitute the fundamental departure from the conventional African state model.

In terms of Africa's development, the AES is a vital, high-risk laboratory. It aims to demonstrate that the prerequisite for both political and economic success can be security-led integration rather than just economic integration. The opportunity is to establish a sustainable, self-financed transition by utilising the region's enormous, underutilised solar and wind potential and implementing practical, results-driven financing mechanisms, such as the creative toolkit created by the ASEAN region. Success would offer other vulnerable states in the Global South a convincing, independent model.

II. The geopolitical crucible: Decolonization and the formation of the AES

A. The failure of the status quo: Françafrique and the security vacuum

A lengthy history of structural grievances stemming from the colonial era gave rise to the AES. In the past, France's sub-Saharan African sphere of influence, known as Françafrique, included the member states of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Niger's 1961 defence agreement, which gave France almost complete control over the uranium that powers a third of France's electricity grid while Niger remained one of the world's poorest countries, is a famous example of this historical context. Defence agreements frequently led to the external exploitation of natural resources. A strong, widespread anti-Western and anti-French feeling was fostered by this discrepancy.

The severe and perceived inability of regional and international security mechanisms, such as the G5 Sahel, to control the protracted and intensifying terrorist insurgency served as the immediate impetus for the creation of the AES. Because they pledged to upend this unsatisfactory security and development status quo, the military juntas that took control of the three countries between 2020 and 2023 garnered broad public support.

The AES was formally founded in September 2023 with the signing of the Liptako-Gourma Charter. Using the "natural right of States to individual or collective self-defence," the Charter's main pledge is collective defence. The contracting parties are expressly obligated to "prevent, manage and quell any armed rebellion or other threat to the territorial integrity or sovereignty" under Article 5. Therefore, these new regimes' political legitimacy is inextricably linked to their capacity to show a quick and noticeable increase in security and to break the colonial economic links that the people believe have failed them. The public discontent that drove the coups might swiftly turn against the new ruling authorities if security benefits are not achieved.

B. The ideological foundation: Pan-Africanism and the rejection of external authority

The radical restoration of national and international sovereignty is the philosophical core of the AES movement. This movement is consistent with self-determination principles, which are acknowledged as fundamental to contemporary international law. This turn is supported by an academic framework known as "Decolonial Alignment," which contends that the observed changes in foreign policy are driven by anti-colonial resistance narratives and a critique of neo-colonial control, echoing the ideas of scholars such as Frantz Fanon and Kwame Nkrumah, rather than being merely practical reactions to external security concerns.

The AES's proponents see its establishment as the cornerstone of a sovereign pan-African vision of "tectonic ambition" constructed over the ruins of French dominance rather than just a military agreement. The youth, who see rejecting the West as necessary for self-determination, strongly support this position.

The three governments' collective withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African governments (ECOWAS), which was formally finalised in January 2025, was the most tangible example of this rejection. Excessive influence from "powerful foreign forces," ECOWAS's "departure from the ideals of the founding fathers and of pan-Africanism," and a perceived lack of assistance in their fight against terrorism were all mentioned by the AES members. This refusal presents ECOWAS as a Paris-dependent organisation. The practicality of employing regional economic communities as the main building blocks for continental unity and integration is called into question by this breach, which poses significant problems to the larger agenda of the African Union (AU). The AU must reconsider its current regional integration tools in light of the AES's formation, which points to a continental shift towards more flexible, issue-based collaboration.

III. Breaking the mould: The AES as a security-led developmental experiment

A. Reversing the paradigm: Security as the precondition for integration

By adopting a security-first integration paradigm, the AES seeks to defy the conventional concept of African regional blocs. In contrast to ECOWAS, which has traditionally placed a higher priority on economic harmonisation and trade liberalisation, the AES views collective defence and the suppression of violent uprisings as the main means of establishing political and economic integration.

This approach is an experiment for the Global South, where integration attempts are frequently hampered by external militancy and inadequate administrative capacities. The Alliance's legitimacy is largely dependent on its capacity to show a proactive, African-led approach to regional stability, in contrast to ECOWAS's alleged lack of tangible outcomes. If successful, this security-led strategy would show how addressing current dangers may facilitate deeper collaboration in other areas, serving as a useful model for other conflict-affected areas across the globe.

B. The quest for financial and monetary autonomy

A key element of the AES's "tectonic ambition" is taking over monetary policy. The CFA franc, which has long been denounced as a "colonial currency" linked to the French Treasury that has supposedly "suffocated the Sahelian economies for almost a century," is about to be abandoned by the alliance.

In May 2025, the AES announced the establishment of the Confederal Bank for Investment and Development (CBID) to enable this financial independence. In order to lessen dependency on outside organisations and uphold financial sovereignty as a fundamental tenet of the Alliance, the bank's explicit mandate is to provide independent finance for vital infrastructure and development projects.

The organisational and theoretical underpinnings of a new common currency that would be backed by the member states' natural resources are being discussed. This resource-backed monetary system poses serious financial dangers even though it philosophically supports the sovereignty objective. The currency and the assets of the CBID are vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market when they depend on commodity prices. Furthermore, the stability of any system supported by resources is seriously threatened by the significant security threats, as terrorist organisations intentionally target economic infrastructure like gold and logistical locations. Therefore, quick security stabilisation of important extraction and production sites is necessary for the resource-currency initiative to succeed.

C. Resource nationalism and state-directed economic control

Beyond monetary policy, real self-reliance necessitates structural adjustments, particularly in the areas of resource ownership management and basic production structure modifications. More state control over important economic sectors is part of the current trajectory.

This resource nationalism has a clear application in Mali, the second-largest gold producer in Africa. By implementing regulatory measures and collaborating with a non-Western organisation (a Russian business) to build a domestic gold refinery, the military junta has taken serious action to control the gold industry. Increasing domestic value addition and capturing revenue streams that formerly came from overseas are the goals of this action.

There is an instant "double-bind" when the three landlocked AES nations leave ECOWAS. They must avoid conventional port access points in ECOWAS countries like Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal, which puts them at risk of economic isolation and higher maritime access expenses while pursuing economic independence. Immediate, strategic geopolitical and physical integration measures are required due to this vulnerability. To combat the economic danger posed by isolation, access must be secured through new coastal partners like Togo, which is ideally situated as a transit hub for exports of goods and natural resources.

The contrasting approaches of the former and current models are summarized below.

Table 1: Strategic divergence: Comparing the ECOWAS/Françafrique model vs. the AES Paradigm

IV. Opportunities for sustainable transformation

A. Energy sovereignty: The untapped potential

The Sahel region is still extremely "energy poor," with per capita energy consumption of less than 0.2 toe/capita, which is 10 times lower than the global average and less than half of the norm for Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic growth and quality of life are severely hampered by this lack of energy infrastructure.

Importantly, though, the area has a wealth of renewable energy resources (solar, wind, and hydro). The UNDP has set a lofty goal of supplying more than 150 million people with inexpensive, clean energy by 2025, demonstrating the enormous potential for the clean energy transition. Particularly in rural areas where electricity availability can be as low as 2%, localised projects like the small-scale hydroelectric dams constructed in Guinea's villages show the feasibility of decentralised innovation backed by development partners to close the energy gap. These programs promote local ownership and socioeconomic use by highlighting not just the availability of power but also its potential.

B. Climate resilience and water management

The Alliance has rightly designated energy and climate as priority areas. Achieving true sustainability in the Sahelian drylands, where the effects of climate change are severe, is intrinsically related to efficiently managing natural resources and guaranteeing fair access to them.

The Great Green Wall (GGW), which aims to enhance livelihoods and fight desertification, is an important regional project. Unfortunately, security risks, a political void, and inadequate money are allegedly "facing the risk of collapse" for the GGW. The AES's declared goal of sovereignty and the reality of GGW finance are fundamentally at odds: Sahel countries have historically relied almost exclusively on external funding from the African Union, European Union, and other donors, failing to allocate domestic budgetary spending. A hypocritical dependency trap is created by this reliance on outside finance while vehemently opposing outside political influence. 

The Confederal Bank for Investment and Development (CBID) must be expressly capitalised to finance and de-risk significant national projects like the GGW restoration, proving commitment through sovereign money rather than assistance dependency, in order for the AES project to verify its rhetoric of self-reliance.

C. Agricultural value chains and rural development

Two out of every three Sahelian people depend on agriculture for the fundamental economic stability of the AES states. Therefore, reducing poverty and attaining stability requires giving agriculture, rural development, and food security top priority.

Sustainable development is characterised by connecting equality, human growth, and the basic human right to self-determination, in addition to protecting the environment. An Integrated Territorial Approach (ITA), which targets the most vulnerable and fragile areas with flexibility and stakeholder diversity, is emphasised by the AES framework.

However, resources are under tremendous strain due to the fast demographic increase (high birth rates combined with rising life expectancy). The ensuing social insecurity will worsen instability and possibly encourage recruitment for armed groups if agricultural and energy output cannot quickly scale to absorb the enormous youth bulge. The policy conclusion is that in order to maintain long-term stability and promote the sustained growth that results in reduced birth rates, developmental interventions in areas like energy availability, health, and education must be seen as crucial security measures.

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