The next energy crisis will be financial before it is physical

This article is part of In conversation about sustainable finance & emission reduction systems, a new series by Diego Balverde. You're reading volume nine of the Breaking news series. Here is volume eight

Prologue

The next energy crisis will not necessarily begin when oil, gas, electricity or fuel physically disappears. It will begin earlier, when energy is still available, but many companies can no longer finance it under reasonable conditions. That is the difference between a visible crisis and a silent one. Physical scarcity is seen in empty fuel stations, delayed vessels, stopped factories or stressed airports. Financial scarcity is less visible, but often more destructive: more expensive credit lines, costlier hedging, more cautious banks, inventories that become impossible to carry, suppliers demanding advance payments and companies discovering that they are not trapped by lack of customers, but by lack of liquidity to survive volatility.

Energy has stopped being only an operating input. It has become a moving financial burden. When oil rises, the cost of filling a tank is not the only thing that increases. The working capital required to buy fuel, hold inventories, hedge positions, insure transport, pay freight, finance suppliers and keep operations open until invoices are collected also rises. At that point, a company may still have demand, contracts and products, but become trapped by a cash-flow gap. The Federal Reserve has already placed this concern at the centre of the financial system: in its May 2026 Financial Stability Report, market contacts most frequently cited geopolitical risks and an oil shock as relevant threats to financial stability, alongside persistent inflation, private credit and artificial intelligence. Oil no longer appears only as a commodity. It appears as banking risk.

Expensive energy is not only paid for; it is financed

When a company buys cheap and stable energy, energy behaves like an operating cost. When it buys expensive and volatile energy, energy becomes a financial problem. A factory that pays more for electricity needs more cash. An airline that pays more for jet fuel needs more hedging. A shipping company that pays more for bunker fuel needs more capital per voyage. A distributor buying more expensive diesel needs to finance heavier inventories. A farmer facing higher diesel, fertiliser and transport costs needs credit before planting, not after selling. The crisis appears when energy becomes more expensive faster than the ability to finance it.

This is the point many analyses still fail to capture. A company does not need to physically run out of fuel to enter stress. It is enough for the bank to reduce limits, the supplier to shorten payment terms, hedging costs to rise, maritime insurance to become more expensive or buyers to pay late. The company continues to operate, but with less financial oxygen. Energy is available, but the balance sheet can no longer support it. The EIA projected in its May 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook that global oil inventories would fall by an average of 8.5 million barrels per day during the second quarter of 2026, keeping Brent near $106 per barrel in May and June, after touching $138 on April 7 and averaging $117 in April. That curve does not describe normality. It describes an economy forced to finance energy under stress.

For an energy-intensive company, moving from $80 to $110 per barrel is not only a price variation. It is more money immobilised in inventories, more risk between purchase and sale, more currency exposure, more need for hedging, more pressure on margins and greater dependence on banks. The company may sell the same volume and still need more credit to survive. That is why the next energy crisis will be financial before it is physical. The first question will not be whether there is energy. It will be who can buy it, finance it and hedge its volatility without breaking the balance sheet.

Banks already read energy as credit risk

The banking system does not look at energy as an abstract issue. It looks at energy through borrowers. If a company pays more for fuel, electricity, transport or inputs, its margin falls. If its margin falls, its repayment capacity deteriorates. If repayment capacity deteriorates, the bank adjusts conditions. If the bank adjusts conditions, the company invests less. If it invests less, efficiency, maintenance and future capacity decline. Then the next shock hits a more fragile system. The crisis feeds itself.

The Federal Reserve frames this problem in macro-financial terms: an oil shock can feed inflation, complicate monetary policy and increase financial vulnerabilities. That means energy has stopped being only a consumer-price issue. It is interest-rate risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, refinancing risk and stability risk. If oil rises, transport rises. If transport rises, food and goods rise. If food and goods rise, inflation becomes more persistent. If inflation becomes more persistent, central banks delay rate cuts or keep rates elevated. If rates remain elevated, companies refinance under worse conditions. If they refinance under worse conditions, they reduce investment. If they reduce investment, the future energy system becomes even more vulnerable.

The current tension in Hormuz shows how an operational data point can become a financial data point. Reuters reported on May 15, 2026, that Brent rose more than 3% to $109.19 per barrel after Donald Trump said he was losing patience with Iran, while the market continued to monitor the partial recovery of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. According to that report, 30 vessels crossed in one day, still far below the pre-war average of 140. In other words, there may be movement, but not normality; there may be flow, but not confidence; there may be supply, but not stability.

This kind of volatility forces banks to think differently. It is no longer enough to look at a company's historical EBITDA. Banks must look at energy sensitivity, transport exposure, price pass-through capacity, inventories, contracts, hedging, insurance, collection periods and dependence on critical routes. In such a world, energy efficiency stops being an environmental label and becomes a solvency variable. A company that consumes less energy per unit produced, measures emissions, reduces logistics waiting times, optimises routes and can demonstrate verified savings is less risky than an opaque company that is fuel-intensive and dependent on cheap credit.

The crisis will punish those who do not control their system

The next energy crisis will be selective. It will not hit everyone equally. It will punish more severely the companies that consume energy without measuring it, buy fuel without coverage, transport without optimisation, operate ports with delays, maintain inefficient fleets, fail to control inventories and cannot demonstrate verified reductions. The difference between surviving and falling will not be only size. It will be control. A large company can be vulnerable if its structure is rigid. A mid-sized company can be more resilient if it measures, reduces, electrifies, stores and finances well.

This directly affects oil and gas, transport, ports, aviation, food, mining, construction, chemicals, fertilisers, logistics and tourism. All these sectors have something in common: they do not only consume energy; they depend on financed energy. They buy before collecting, transport before selling, store before invoicing and operate with margins that can compress in weeks. If energy costs rise and credit tightens at the same time, the problem multiplies. The IEA stated in its May 2026 Oil Market Report that jet fuel prices almost tripled after exports from the Middle East were cut off, and that higher prices, a weaker economic environment and fuel-saving measures would pressure global oil consumption. That sentence shows the new equilibrium: the system does not normalise through abundance, but because demand begins to be destroyed.

Here the business question changes. It is no longer enough to ask how much energy costs. Companies must ask how much capital it immobilises, how much margin it destroys, how much additional credit it requires, how much risk the bank sees, how much insurance becomes more expensive, how much inventory must be financed and how much value is lost by failing to measure. Poorly managed energy stops being a cost. It becomes financial risk.

Scenarios now opening

If tension in Hormuz continues, the market will not need a total interruption to sustain high prices. Slower routes, less visible vessels, more expensive insurance, lower inventories and more nervous buyers will be enough. If Brent remains near $100 for longer than expected, many companies will not fail because of lack of sales, but because of rising working-capital needs. If central banks perceive that energy is keeping inflation alive, rates may take longer to fall and cheap credit will stop working as a shock absorber. If refining and transport remain under pressure, the problem will not be only crude oil, but refined products: diesel, jet fuel, bunker fuel, petrochemicals and fertilisers. If companies do not measure consumption, emissions, logistics waiting times and operational losses, they will be treated as black boxes by banks, insurers and investors. And if governments respond only with subsidies, without demanding verified efficiency, they will buy time but not reduce fragility.

The most likely scenario is not a classic energy crisis with absolute lack of energy. It is a crisis of financial access to energy. Energy will exist, but it will be more expensive, more volatile, harder to insure, harder to finance and more unequal in its impact. Companies with data, efficiency, MRV, storage and traceability will obtain better conditions. Companies without control will depend on banks, suppliers or governments keeping them alive. That difference will define winners and losers.

The solution is to reduce the financial fragility of energy

Producing more energy can help. Releasing reserves can help. Reopening routes can help. But none of those measures solves the problem if companies remain financially fragile every time a shock appears. The real answer combines efficiency, storage, MRV, smart ports, traceability, operational electrification and climate finance. This is where the BalGreen approach becomes relevant: reducing wasted energy means reducing credit needs; measuring avoided emissions creates financeable information; optimising logistics releases trapped capital; adding storage reduces exposure to price peaks; converting efficiency into MRV transforms operational savings into financial assets.

The system must begin with a diagnosis of energy and financial exposure: how much a company consumes, where energy is lost, how much working capital that consumption requires, what happens if the price rises 20%, 40% or 60%, what part of the risk can be reduced and which investments can be paid for through verified savings. Then comes the operational intervention: fewer waiting times, partial electrification, more efficient routes, predictive maintenance, leak control, lower auxiliary consumption and efficiency across ports, refineries, fleets, airports and logistics nodes. Then comes the MRV layer: measurement, reporting and verification of savings, avoided emissions and productivity improvements. Finally comes the financial structure: transition bonds, performance-linked credit, savings-backed financing, compliance instruments and private capital supported by data.

Savings must stop being invisible. If a company reduces energy consumption but does not measure it, it only has an internal improvement. If it measures, verifies and reports it, it has a financial story. It can show lower risk, better margins, less exposure, more resilience and a stronger position before banks, insurers and investors. That will be the new collateral: verified efficiency. An efficient port is worth more than a congested port. A refinery with lower internal energy consumption is worth more than an opaque refinery. A fleet with optimised routes is worth more than a fleet burning fuel without control. A company with reliable MRV is worth more than a company that only promises.

Conclusion

The next energy crisis will not begin with the lights going out. It will begin with a more expensive credit line. It will not begin with a factory completely stopped. It will begin with inventories that become impossible to finance. It will not begin with empty fuel stations. It will begin with companies that can still buy energy, but can no longer sustain its financial cost.

That is the real risk. Future energy will not be only a question of availability, but of solvency. Whoever controls consumption, routes, inventories, emissions, storage and data will be more capable of surviving. Whoever depends on expensive energy, cheap credit and stable routes will be exposed.

The question is no longer only who has energy, but who can finance it without breaking. How many companies are prepared to sustain three months of expensive oil without losing liquidity? How many banks are already measuring the energy exposure of their clients as credit risk? How many ports, refineries, airports and fleets can demonstrate verified savings instead of only promising efficiency? How much money is lost every year through wasted energy that is never measured? And who will capture the value when efficiency stops being an environmental discourse and becomes the new financial collateral?

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