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The rising prominence of energy transition-skeptic narratives
The global energy discourse is polarized between two opposing narratives regarding the feasibility of a rapid energy transition. On the one hand there is a broad climate movement, supported by an overwhelming majority of climate scientists, advocating (among other things) for an accelerated build-out of clean energy and electrification to avert climate disaster. On the other hand, fossil fuel advocates and self-proclaimed “energy pragmatists” (e.g. Daniel Yergin et al) argue that a rapid transition is unrealistic, unfeasible, or impossible, owing to systemic lock-in, lack of historic precedent, and a combination of material/economic/technological constraints. They contend that a rapid energy transition represents a naive fantasy by pointing out the growing energy demand in emerging economies, technical challenges (such as the intermittency of wind and solar energy, or outdated power grid infrastructure), or the supposed advantages of fossil fuels (notably high energy density and production costs that ignore externalities). Closely related to thIs transition-skeptic narrative, “fossil fuel gradualism” - the belief that the pains and costs of a rapid transition would outweigh its benefits - has become a popular form of climate denial. In 2024, the Center for Countering Digital Hate found that “New Climate Denial”, which emphasizes narratives that undermine confidence in climate solutions, constituted 70% of climate denial content on YouTube. Concerned about the rise of “energy pragmatism” and “fossil fuel gradualism”, the president of the COP30, André Corrêa do Lago, recently warned about the “migration from scientific denial to a denial that economic measures against climate change can be good for the economy and for people.”
Scholars are weighting in
Many arguments in support of prolonged fossil fuel use, usually brought forward by climate science skeptics such as Bjorn Lomborg or Alex Epstein, have been effectively debunked for misrepresenting science or relying on pseudo-scientific claims (see here, or here, for example). Similarly, the widely cited transition-skeptic claim made by Finnish researcher Simon Michaux about the impossibility of the energy transition due to the insufficiency of the world’s mineral resources, has been debunked for relying on ridiculous assumptions. However, other arguments in support of “energy pragmatism” may seem more difficult to counter. More accomplished scholars, such as Vaclav Smil (e.g. in his recent publication “How the World Really Works”) or the historian Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, have lent their intellectual weight to energy transition skepticism. In a similar vein as Smil, Fressoz asserts in his book “More and More and More” (reviewed here by Adam Tooze) that the narrative of an energy transition is flawed because of a lack of historical precedent. Analysing the history of the world’s energy systems, Fressoz finds that the introduction of new fuels in the past complemented rather than replaced existing fuels, thereby increasing total consumption. Given the unprecedented nature of a transition from one energy technology to another, Fressoz and Smil basically suggest that the Paris Agreement’s goals could “realistically” only be achieved by a deliberate contraction of energy demand.
Defending the possibility of a rapid energy transition
Responding to scholarly transition skepticism, clean energy advocates such as Kingsmill Bond, Michael Barnard, or Nafeez Ahmed rightly point out that we are currently witnessing an unprecedented process of energy technology substitution at a fundamental level. The increasing availability of “electrotech” (i.e. solar PV, windpower, batteries, heat pumps, electric vehicles, electric heat etc) allows fossil fuel-importing countries to rid themselves of their energy dependence on autocratic Petrostates, as well as of the inefficiency and pollution of combustion processes. It is crucial to recognize that electrotech assets do not require a constant fuel supply during their operational lifetime: An initial investment of energy and materials during their manufacturing and installation enables average lifetimes of more than 15-25 years of fuel-independent, GHG emission-free operation. For the same period, fossil fuel assets demand constant mining, processing, and transportation activities during the operational lifetime, resulting in operational GHG emissions that exceed any embodied footprint by orders of magnitude. In parallel, continuing electrotech cost declines are rendering incumbent fossil fuel-based technologies increasingly obsolete. In numerous regions, cost reductions and deployments at scale have already disrupted fossil fuel dominance. While the current pace of the energy transition remains insufficient at a global level, the possibility for its regional acceleration through legislative support and public investments exists.
The underestimated potential of political human agency
Among the responses defending the possibility of a rapid transition is an article by Liam Denning, which highlights how fossil fuel advocates and „energy pragmatists“ tend to either downplay or underestimate the potential of collective human agency. While scholars like Fressoz and Smil may be experts in their respective research domains, they are not experts in theories of societal change. Without a sufficiently well-informed and imaginative political “growth mindset”, the transformative potential of well-designed laws, standards, subsidies, taxes, public investments etc can be easily overlooked. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that political activism, advocacy and legislation can fundamentally alter social system design parameters like guardrails, goals, and incentive structures. After all, it is the potential to create new rules and path-dependencies that distinguishes the behavior of social agents from the deterministic predictability of natural processes. While it is impossible to bend the laws of physics to political will, it is possible for political will to reshape the rules by which economic systems operate. Social realities can be reconstructed as societies revise the rules by which they govern themselves.
The fallacy of historic determinism: the past is a poor predictor of the future
There is a saying that although history doesn’t repeat itself, it often rhymes. Similarly, it could be said that history allows for new songs to be written. The belief that universal laws or historical patterns determine future societal developments constitutes a fallacy of historic determinism („historicism”). Commonly associated with the works of Hegel and Marx, historic determinism has been convincingly critiqued in Karl Popper‘s "The Poverty of Historicism". Because historic trends are not the same as laws, the past serves as a poor predictor when it comes to the possibility of human progress. Numerous examples for unexpectedly successful collective efforts exist. For instance, it took the US less than a decade from Kennedy’s stated goal to achieve the moon landing in 1969. As another example, China managed to transform itself from a minor supplier to a global electrotech leader over a period of less than two decades. Moreover, hardly anyone could have predicted civilizational achievements like, for example, the abolition of slavery in 1865, the declaration of universal human rights in 1948, or The Civil Rights Act in 1964, simply by extrapolating from the past. Since the absence of past precedent does not preclude future possibility, dismissing the energy transition as “unrealistic” or “impossible” on the grounds of historical analysis is misguided. There is always a first time for extraordinary, previously unimaginable civilizational achievements.
The semantic confusion and social conditionality of societal “realism“
Extreme positions often oversimplify and neglect a vast space of nuanced considerations in between. Asserting that a complete and instant transition would be impossible under current conditions represents a rather trivial truth claim, for example. It does not imply that a rapid transition is similarly impossible over variable time frames or under different conditions. It is warranted, of course, to challenge naive beliefs, which ignore well established scientific insights, or a problems’ root causes (like, for example, the belief that current market designs and/or technology forces alone would suffice to solve the climate crisis). But unnecessarily implying the impossibility of an energy transition, or the inevitability of prolonged fossil fuel use, is not warranted. Part of the problem is that labelling a normative aspiration - like the goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement - as “unrealistic” has a variety of meanings, ranging from “difficult”/”challenging”, over ”improbable” to “unfeasible” and finally, “impossible”. But the fact that achieving a goal may be difficult or improbable doesn’t make it impossible. Making a clear distinction between “impossibility” and “improbability” is crucial because it separates despair from determination. The energy pragmatists’ characterization of a rapid energy transition as “impossible”, and of prolonged fossil fuel use as the “only realistic” pathway, severely limits the solution space and invites distracting technical debates. In contrast, a shared belief that achieving an ambitious societal goal requires unprecedented political will, improbable as it may seem in the near-term, encourages a key question: What would it take - and what is the best we can do - to make the improbable, the unprecedented, happen?
When the enemy of one’s enemy is not one’s friend
At its core, the debate over the possibility of a rapid energy transition pits advocates of human political agency against proponents of some form of deterministic social, historical or technological “realism”. Besides “energy pragmatists”, we can also observe degrowth “realists” who attempt to reduce the energy debate to a binary choice between either prolonged fossil fuel use or economic contraction (voluntary or involuntary). Influencers like Nate Hagens, for example, utilize scholarly transition-skepticism to claim that only economic contraction can stabilize human society, dismissing the energy transition as a distraction. By attacking the possibility of a rapid transition rather than its insufficient pace, market failure, or rampant climate science denial and misinformation, degrowth „realists” inadvertently align with fossil fuel advocates and “energy pragmatists”. This unintended alliance has undesirable consequences. The focus of climate action strategies and policy demands shifts from targeting the use of fossil fuels as the primary driver of the climate crisis towards a broader critique of externality-denying capitalism and unsustainable consumer culture. The broader critique is not wrong in itself, and a key aspect of a shared long-term vision, but declaring its incompatibility with a rapid transition is not helpful and even counterproductive in the near-term. In a public sphere as misinformed about the severity of the climate crisis as it is today, a majority of voters is certain to favor prolonged fossil fuel use when forced to choose between it and economic contraction. Indeed, if the goal were to effectively derail the climate movement, promoting a false binary between fossil fuel dependence and economic contraction would be an effective strategy.
Different types of techno-optimism and techno-pessimism
To overcome the climate crisis, we must avoid fracturing over ideological or epistemic purity and instead unite under a shared long-term vision of a better future, in which technology and market systems are sustainably utilized in the service of life. To facilitate building a broad coalition based on a shared view of reality, it is crucial to distinguish between various forms of techno-optimism and techno-pessimism. Within the techno-optimist camp, the spectrum ranges from naive to pragmatic. Naive techno-optimists maintain that technological progress and current economic system designs are sufficient to address the climate crisis. They tend to overestimate the impact potential of nascent niche solutions - such as fusion energy, carbon capture and storage, or green hydrogen - while underestimating the severity and urgency of the crisis itself. Pragmatic techno-optimists, on the other hand, focus on commercially available solutions and, recognizing the inadequacy of the current transition pace, advocate for correcting market failures and effective climate policies for a sustainable and fair transition. Similarly, the spectrum of techno-pessimism ranges from pragmatic to excessive. Pragmatic techno-pessimists rightly stress that decarbonization pathways must be as sustainable and just as possible, include shifts in consumption patterns, and not be constrained by the primacy of GDP growth. Excessive techno-pessimists, however, insist with undue confidence that a rapid energy transition is “impossible“ and that a controlled contraction of economic activity is „the only way“. Efforts to accelerate the substitution of fossil fuels with renewable energy are dismissed as incrementalist, counterproductive distractions. Accordingly, excessive techno-pessimism forms the intellectual foundation of degrowth “realism“.
Conclusion: The pragmatic middle ground between techno-optimism and techno-pessimism
Both “energy pragmatists” and excessive techno-pessimists share the assumption that humanity’s agency is constrained by historical, technological, or economic laws. They both promote a transition-skeptic narrative to advance either prolonged fossil fuel use or degrowth in opposition to a rapid energy transition. But this narrative neglects the transformative potential of coordinated, collective political action. It weakens the climate movement - and strengthens the fossil fuel industry - at a moment when unity of purpose and a shared understanding of the severity of the climate crisis and its potential solution space is most needed. For the climate movement to succeed, it must build a broad coalition, a big tent capable of meeting the moment, which speaks to a silent majority. This requires finding a pragmatic common ground between the extremes of “naive” techno-optimism and “excessive” techno-pessimism. Consequently, a more nuanced version of transition-skepticism, which granted the benefit of doubt when it comes to the politically enabled possibility of a rapid transition, would be more productive and aligned with the broader climate movement. In the end, the future will be won by those who successfully build bridges and refuse to let the perfect become the enemy of the possible.
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