Latin America weighs its future amid elections, minerals and global power play
· 14 min read
Latin America enters a historic wave of national elections between 2024 and 2026, with the global spotlight fixed on a region that sits atop the resources driving the energy transition, digital infrastructure, and 21st-century manufacturing. Eight pivotal countries—Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Guyana, Peru, Colombia, and Honduras—face electoral contests whose outcomes will shape the trajectory of global supply chains for critical minerals and energy at a time of escalating U.S.-China technological rivalry (AS/COA 2025; World Bank 2024).
Latin America’s significance transcends its regional boundaries. The “Lithium Triangle” (Bolivia, Argentina, Chile) holds more than half of global lithium reserves, essential for batteries, grid storage, and AI hardware (CEPAL 2024b; OLADE 2024).
The region produces nearly 46 percent of the world’s copper, with Chile alone responsible for about a quarter of global output and nearly a third of lithium supply (Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines 2024). Brazil dominates global niobium production—a metal vital for aerospace and defense—and is emerging in rare earths, oil, and iron ore (IBGE 2024). Meanwhile, Guyana has become the fastest-growing petro-state following landmark offshore oil discoveries (Guyana Bureau of Statistics 2025). In Argentina, the Vaca Muerta formation is among the world’s largest shale gas and oil reserves, positioning the country as a major energy exporter (INDEC 2024).
This abundance has shifted the region from a passive commodity exporter to an arena of competition between Washington and Beijing, each seeking to secure technological and energy security through critical materials. China processes over 60 percent of global lithium and controls rare earth supply chains, creating U.S. and allied vulnerabilities. Western nations are scrambling to diversify sources through ventures like the Minerals Security Partnership, but it is Latin America’s energy, minerals, and political choices that will decide if these flows favor a China-centric network or a diversified global marketplace (CSIS 2024; U.S. Department of State 2024).
Polling and electoral trends suggest a likely regional turn toward center-right governments. Economic uncertainty, inflation, security crises, and dissatisfaction with incumbent leftist and center-left leaders drive this realignment (Latinobarómetro 2024). In Chile, President Boric’s approval is at 31 percent amid failed reforms and security worries. Colombia’s President Petro faces even steeper challenges, with approval at 28 percent and high opposition. Brazil’s President Lula’s disapproval (41 percent) has overtaken his approval (24 percent). In contrast, Argentina’s President Milei and La Libertad Avanza have gained momentum, topping legislative polls and cementing a strong pro-market position.
In an era of unprecedented information access, the atrocities committed in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba—together with the absence of a decisive response from leftist governments—have significantly eroded their credibility. Compounded by politics rooted in resentment, entrenched “anti-Americanism,” and unfulfilled promises, public trust has steadily declined, leaving many voters disillusioned with leaders they once championed. As a result, electoral preferences across Latin America are undergoing a marked shift, with an increasing share of the electorate gravitating toward more liberal, pro-market alternatives that pledge stability, security, and economic opportunity.
Bolivia’s presidential election is projected as the highest-stakes contest for critical minerals. The ruling MAS party is divided between President Luis Arce and ex-president Evo Morales, creating uncertainty in lithium policy (INE Bolivia 2024). Bolivia, with the world’s largest lithium reserves, just closed a $1 billion joint venture with China’s CBC consortium. The vote will set the tone for investor openness versus state-led control, impacting global battery supply chains.
Bolivia also holds considerable natural gas reserves, integral to regional energy security. Recent polls indicate that the presidential race is increasingly competitive, with liberal-leaning candidates Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, a former president, and Samuel Doria Medina, a prominent businessman and three-time presidential contender, emerging as frontrunners. Their rise reflects growing public fatigue with two decades of MAS rule and could signal a shift toward more market-friendly approaches to lithium governance and foreign investment.
Guyana’s elections crystallize as the country becomes the hemisphere’s fastest-growing energy superpower. Since 2015, ExxonMobil, Hess, and CNOOC have uncovered over 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil in the giant Stabroek block, and production is set to exceed 667,000 barrels per day by mid-2025—enormous for a nation of under a million people (Guyana Bureau of Statistics 2025). Gas field development is also advancing, enabling Guyana to tap into future LNG exports.
The recent oil boom has catapulted GDP growth into double digits. The electoral outcome will shape Guyana’s stance between pro-Western policies and increased openness to Chinese lending and infrastructure. Moreover, Guyana faces acute tensions with Venezuela, which revives claims on the oil-rich Essequibo region after major discoveries. Caracas has threatened referenda and military maneuvers, further elevating the geopolitical stakes (Ellis 2024).
Honduras, while less prominent in minerals, is significant geopolitically, with President Xiomara Castro’s administration switching recognition from Taiwan to China and unlocking major hydroelectric projects. The upcoming election will determine whether this alignment—and openness to Chinese investment—persists, or if opposition parties more closely tied to the United States provide a course correction (Ellis 2025).
For many, Honduras might seem insignificant, but its libertarian experiment in Próspera could become a test case with the potential to shape the region’s political and economic future.
Argentina will hold legislative elections renewing 127 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (half the chamber) and 24 Senate seats (one-third). For President Javier Milei, this first midterm test is critical, as La Libertad Avanza stands poised to increase legislative power, facilitating a pro-market and Western-aligned economic agenda. Beyond lithium, Argentina is home to Vaca Muerta, the second-largest shale gas reserve and fourth-largest shale oil formation on earth. Vaca Muerta supports ambitions to make Argentina an energy exporter, diversifying global LNG and crude supply at a critical time for markets (INDEC 2024).
Chile, the world’s largest copper exporter and major lithium supplier, heads toward a presidential vote reflecting the tension between resource nationalism and market-friendly reforms. The leftist coalition’s selection of Jeannette Jara as its flagbearer contrasts with polls favoring center-right, pro-market candidates. The nation’s mining sector is key for green tech globally, with copper and lithium supply pivotal for EVs and renewables (CEPAL 2024b). Energy debates also center around renewables, with Chile a pioneer in solar and wind capacity, deepening its importance for the region’s energy transition.
Costa Rica, long recognized for democratic stability and leadership in green energy (over 98 percent of electricity from renewables), holds a key general election to select its president, two vice presidents, and all 57 deputies for the Legislative Assembly. The election’s outcome will shape not just its own climate leadership and foreign policy alignment, but also regional approaches to multilateral cooperation and environmental regulation. In a context of rising geopolitical tensions, Costa Rica’s steady integration with U.S., European, and multilateral partners underscores its role as a model for sustainable development and democratic resilience in Central America. Its voice will be relevant for shaping climate finance, new energy infrastructure, and the region’s collective bargain within both hemispheric and global platforms.
Peru’s general elections will occur following the inauguration of the Chancay megaproject—a $3.5 billion deepwater port financed by China, drastically cutting shipping times between South America and Asia and turning Peru into a logistics hub. Peru is the world’s No. 2 copper exporter, vital for the energy transition, and a significant producer of silver, zinc, and emerging lithium resources. Political stability, mining policy, and foreign investment will all be shaped by the new administration, heavily influencing global mineral and energy markets (Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines 2024).
The country is currently led by President Dina Boluarte, who assumed office in 2022 after the impeachment of left-wing President Pedro Castillo. Although officially unaffiliated with any political party, Boluarte has governed with the support of conservative and center-right blocs in Congress.The most recent congressional composition, resulting from the 2021 elections, gave a majority of seats to right-wing and center-right parties, such as Fuerza Popular, Renovación Popular, and Avanza País. This alignment is expected to continue after 2026, potentially leading to a government favorable to private investment and stricter oversight of community resistance to extractive industries.
Colombia’s presidential elections unfold amid polarizing energy debates. President Gustavo Petro’s government has frozen new oil exploration to accelerate clean energy, but this approach faces roadblocks: Colombia produces around 750,000 barrels of crude a day and remains South America’s third biggest oil exporter, especially to Europe in the wake of the Ukraine war. Petro’s green agenda collides with economic realities and electoral risk; the opposition seeks to moderate the transition and retain investment from both East and West. President Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first openly Marxist head of state, has faced persistent governability challenges since taking office in 2022. His administration has struggled to build stable congressional coalitions, and key reforms have stalled amid widespread opposition. Meanwhile, armed insurgent groups—particularly the ELN and FARC dissidents—have regained control over significant rural areas, and coca cultivation has surged to record levels, with cocaine production increasing by over 24% in 2023 alone, according to the UNODC. These dynamics have deepened public concern over security and stability heading into the 2026 elections.
Brazil’s election comes as President Lula da Silva, confirmed as his party’s candidate despite his age, seeks to maintain the country’s global leadership in critical minerals and energy. As the region’s largest oil producer and the world’s top niobium supplier, Brazil’s oil sector is set for expansion following recent discoveries in the Santos basin by BP—an area expected to yield billions of additional barrels and bolster Brazil’s role as a top-10 crude exporter (IBGE 2024). Brazil is emerging as a lithium exporter, ranks high in global iron ore, and continues to develop renewable energy at scale—balancing cooperation with both China (notably through the BRICS group) and the West.
Chinese policy banks have funneled more than $120 billion in infrastructure and mining loans since 2005, securing lithium, copper, and oil assets through an infrastructure diplomacy built on rapid delivery and non-interference (CEPAL 2024a; Ellis 2025). The recent $1 billion lithium partnership in Bolivia and COSCO’s control of Peru’s Chancay port demonstrate Beijing’s strategic intentions.
The United States, meanwhile, champions initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership, premised on accountable governance, democracy, and the rule of law. These standards can slow processes but aim for resilient and transparent supply chains. Argentina is the only full MSP member in the region, though Peru and Mexico are forum participants (U.S. Department of State 2024).
The Trump administration escalated the strategic use of tariffs, introducing periodic reviews and targeting countries aligned with U.S. adversaries. In mid-2025, sweeping tariffs were imposed on BRICS-aligned nations, with Brazil facing a punitive 50% rate—ostensibly for its alignment with China and Russia but also in response to domestic political pressure and the trial of former president Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally (Atlantic Council 2025; Reuters 2025). This economic statecraft aims to deter further South American alignment with rival powers, but it risks strengthening nationalist politics and driving major economies like Brazil further into China’s orbit. As one Atlantic Council analyst noted, “striking back at US tariffs is unlikely to help the EU achieve its goals of a more stable and open trading partnership with the United States.”
The deployment of tariffs has transcended traditional economic considerations to become a primary instrument of diplomatic persuasion and negotiation (Cochrane 2025; AFSA 2024). As economic statecraft expert Daniel Crocker observed, “When tariff policy is a primary tool of economic statecraft, U.S. diplomats have a unique role to play.” The administration has effectively weaponized trade measures as leverage in unrelated political disputes, from judicial proceedings in Brazil to semiconductor regulations in Europe, fundamentally altering how international economic relationships function.
Latin American countries increasingly seek strategic autonomy, pursuing flexible relationships that maximize leverage and avoid dependence on a single global power. OPEC-style “lithium cartel” proposals and intensifying regional dialogue underscore this collective bargaining impulse (OLADE 2024). Studies suggest that robust regional alliances could help avoid a race to the bottom in foreign investment standards, locking in sustainable development gains.
The historic electoral cycle may either reinforce or undermine these aspirations. From a liberal perspective rooted in multilateralism and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, prioritizing transparent governance, rule of law, and human rights would argue for alignment with the U.S. and Europe. The collective institutional memory and frameworks for hemispheric cooperation—including the Organization of American States—underscore the practical and normative advantages of Western alignment. Meanwhile, realists emphasize that proximity to the U.S. as regional hegemon remains crucial for security and economic stability, as distancing from Washington in favor of far-off powers carries significant opportunity costs.
In practical terms, pragmatic transactionalism is ascendant, with countries seeking to diversify partnerships according to national interests. Still, both liberal and realist theories suggest that deepening ties with the U.S. and Europe may yield greater benefits in the long run than a pivot to China and Russia, especially in the face of mounting great power competition. The future of inter-American integration and strategic autonomy, however, will hinge on the quality of governance produced by this electoral supercycle, the preservation of democratic institutions, and the ability to coordinate regional approaches to energy, minerals, and trade in a turbulent global context (Latinobarómetro 2024; CSIS 2024).
The awaited free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia) was finally signed in December 2024 after 25 years of negotiation. The compromise will eliminate tariffs on over 90 percent of goods and forge the world’s largest free trade zone by population, benefiting agribusiness, mining, and energy exporters across the Southern Cone. Ratification challenges remain, especially with European agriculture lobby resistance, but final implementation could anchor South American economies more deeply in global supply and value chains (Science 2020; SSRN 2021).
The recent punitive tariffs imposed on Brazil by the Trump administration, combined with the potential for secondary tariff escalations, may paradoxically strengthen European resolve to complete the EU-Mercosur ratification process. As Jorge Vian, head of Brazil’s ApexBrasil trade promotion agency, told Euronews: “We are very optimistic especially now that US has raised tariffs across the world… With the hostile environment that the world is facing right now we may collaborate to improve the implementation of the agreement” (Euronews 2025).
However, the 50% tariff threat against Brazil introduces complex calculations for European policymakers sympathetic to President Lula’s administration or opposed to Jair Bolsonaro’s political comeback. European leaders who support Brazil’s current democratic government may find themselves torn between commercial imperatives and political solidarity. The tariffs serve as a stark reminder that trade policy has become fully subordinated to political objectives, creating what some analysts call a “weaponization of interdependence.” French agricultural interests, already concerned about Brazilian competition, may use the U.S. tariff precedent to argue for additional safeguards in the EU-Mercosur framework.
The Trump-EU preliminary trade deal, which promises zero tariffs on strategic products and significant U.S. energy purchases by Europe, further complicates Mercosur’s position (Datamarnews 2025). As one analysis noted, “The 15% tariff on EU exports to the U.S., combined with Brussels’ multibillion-dollar pledges to invest in and purchase American energy, could divert resources and political attention from Brussels—potentially delaying further the ratification of the deal negotiated with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay.” The irony is striking: tariffs, ostensibly economic instruments, are being deployed primarily as tools of diplomatic persuasion—demonstrating how economic statecraft has evolved beyond traditional cost-benefit calculations into a realm of pure strategic signaling and coercion (Atlantic Council 2024).
Between 2024 and 2026, electoral outcomes in countries from Bolivia to Costa Rica will steer critical resources, energy policy, and foreign alignments at the heart of the global energy transition. Argentina’s Vaca Muerta, Guyana’s oil surge and border disputes, Brazil’s new oil finds amid BRICS intrigue, Peru’s post-Chancay copper and port boom, and Costa Rica’s model of democratic, renewable-led integration together highlight how Latin voters are deciding not just democratic futures, but the very architecture of the next generation’s energy, industrial, and diplomatic map (AS/COA 2025; CEPAL 2024b; Guyana Bureau of Statistics 2025; IBGE 2024).
The stakes are enormous: as political winds shift, so too do the prospects for resilient, diversified, and responsibly governed global supply chains. In this pivotal moment, democracy and resource power are set to shape the world far beyond the Andes, Amazon, and Central American isthmus.
As voters determine their nations’ democratic futures, they are also quietly deciding who will supply the lithium in next-generation batteries, the copper wiring the world’s electric grids, and the oil and gas balancing the planet’s energy security through a turbulent transition. The intersection of democracy, sovereignty, and energy geopolitics in Latin America is about to be decided at the ballot box, with consequences that will echo far beyond the Andes and Pampas for years to come (AS/COA 2025; CEPAL 2024b; Guyana Bureau of Statistics 2025; IBGE 2024)
Armando Armas is illuminem Senior Contributor and Impact Ambassador. illuminem Voices is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of leading Sustainability & Energy writers.
See how the companies in your sector perform on sustainability. On illuminem’s Data Hub™, access emissions data, ESG performance, and climate commitments for thousands of industrial players across the globe.
Rob Karpati
Rare Earths · Mining Tech
illuminem briefings
Corporate Governance · Rare Earths
illuminem briefings
Energy Sources · Rare Earths
Financial Times
Rare Earths · Energy Sources
International Energy Agency
Energy Transition · Energy Management & Efficiency
Financial Times
Rare Earths · Public Governance