China’s coal: back on the central-plan track – an accidental climate policy?


· 11 min read
Unfortunately, we are living in wartime. Fuel prices are high and volatile due to supply-side factors and various constraints, putting pressure on governments and resource-producing regions alike. In Canada, Alberta, the country’s oil and gas heartland, voted on 19 October on whether to begin a legal path toward independence. At the same time in China, the central government has told Shanxi, the country’s largest coal-producing province for decades, to increase output. The contrast is telling: while Alberta’s relationship with the federal government is being contested politically, China’s coal industry remains subject to direct central intervention.
On 16 October 2026, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planner, and the National Energy Administration (NEA), which oversees the energy sector, held an urgent meeting in Taiyuan, Shanxi’s capital city. They asked the province to draw up a restart plan for idled mines, to bring output back to the normal level and name a list of emergency-supply mines.
The orders came amid the coal market tightening ahead of winter. On 10 October, spot thermal coal at Qinhuangdao port, China’s coal price benchmark, passed 1,000 yuan a tonne, 42% above a year earlier. Most of Shanxi’s coal, however, is sold well below this price. Under NDRC rules for 2026, every coal producer must sell at least 75% of its own output under annual term contracts, and every power plant must cover at least 80% of its needs in the same way. In early September, term-contract coal traded at about 700 yuan a tonne, so a Shanxi miner who is asked to dig more will sell most of the extra coal at around that price.
China sits at the centre of the world coal market. It produces more coal than all other countries combined and consumes about 30% more than the rest of the world put together. It is also the largest importer, buying about 550 million tonnes in 2024, roughly a third of the 1.5 billion tonnes traded worldwide.
At home, king coal still supplies half of China’s primary energy and more than half of its electricity. Power plants and heating boilers burn about 2.3 billion tonnes of thermal coal a year. Steelmaking is the other major consumer: 1 billion tonnes of crude steel and 500 million tonnes of coke are produced a year, which requires roughly 700 million tonnes of coking coal.
Three provinces, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi, supply most of China’s coal. Until this year Shanxi alone produced more than a quarter of national output, and Inner Mongolia produced a similar amount.
China’s coal market has never been fully separated from the state’s production plans. Before the 1990s, planners controlled both output and prices. From 1993, most coal prices were liberalised, but coal supplied to power plants remained subject to a separate, state-regulated contract price. This dual-track system lasted until 2012.
Between 2013 and 2015, coal moved to a single market price. Prices fell for three consecutive years, causing heavy losses for many mines. In 2016, the government cut mining capacity and restored long-term contracts within a narrow guided price range of 500–570 yuan per tonne for Qinhuangdao term-contract coal, alongside spot-market sales.
The limits of this arrangement became clear in 2021, when recovering demand met constrained supply. Spot prices exceeded 2,000 yuan per tonne, and many provinces rationed electricity due to the insufficient incentive to generate. In 2022, NDRC set a wider range of 570–770 yuan per tonne and required power plants to cover nearly all their needs through long-term contracts.
Since then, the government has increasingly supplemented price intervention with direct control over production capacity. In April 2024, NDRC and NEA established a coal capacity reserve system, targeting about 300 million tonnes a year of reserve capacity by 2030. The idea is to keep capacity that can be activated during shortages, with production directed according to on-time needs. Yes, some operations, are just like the central bank to manage short-term interest rate through quantity tools.
Therefore, China’s coal market thus retains two price tracks, but the quantity supplied is increasingly shaped by administrative decisions.

Figure 1. Qinhuangdao 5,500 kcal thermal coal price, 2008–2026.
In 2000, the economists Lawrence Lau, Qian Yingyi and Gérard Roland explained why China’s two-price reform of the 1980s and 1990s worked well, and called it “reform without losers”.
The idea was straightforward. The state freezes each producer’s plan quota at its previous level and enforces it at the low price (the so-called plan price), while anything produced above the quota can be sold at the scarce market price, so:
The last tonne a mine produces earns the market price. Decisions about the next tonne, such as opening a new field or running an extra shift, are therefore made at market prices. Economists call this deciding “at the margin”, and it is where economic efficiency comes from.
The buyers who relied on cheap plan coal keep their cheap coal. Since nobody loses what they had, nobody has a reason to block the reform.
The frozen plan works like a transfer: it moves money from mines to favoured buyers without touching the decision about the next tonne.
Coal supply responded strongly to this logic. During 2002–2012, often called coal’s “golden decade” in China, output rose from about 1.55 to 3.95 billion tonnes (Figure 2), and prices were generally high enough to make mining very profitable. Demand kept rising afterwards, in waves: consumption dipped in 2014–2016 and then set new records in the early 2020s, even as coal’s share of total energy fell from about two-thirds to about half.

Figure 2. China’s raw coal output, 2001–2025, in billion tonnes.
“Reform without losers” depends on one condition: the plan must stay frozen, or relatively static. This may not work anymore.
In recent years, the normal “control-enforcement” process runs as follows. Each November, NDRC issues the next year’s contract rules. Provinces report supply and demand, buyers and sellers are matched, and contracts are uploaded to a national trading platform by mid-December. Obligations are then allocated down the chain, from provinces, coal groups to individual producers. In October 2021, for example, Inner Mongolia’s 53 million tonnes of supply obligations to 18 other provinces were distributed among 29 key coal producers. For 2026, contract volumes were based on each power plant’s coal use from November 2024 to October 2025, giving plants that burned more coal in the previous year a larger allocation of contract coal.
Production targets can also change abruptly in reality. Until early 2026, the main concern was excess supply, as prices fell through 2025. In July 2025, the NEA ordered inspections of mines in eight provinces, including Shanxi and Inner Mongolia, that had exceeded their approved production capacity.
War in Iran that began on 28 February 2026 changed the task within weeks: with traffic through the Strait of Hormuz cut and international energy prices rising, the planners turned to managing scarcity. Then, on 22 May, a coal-methane explosion at the Liushenyu mine killed 82 people. Safety inspections idled mines across Shanxi, and the province’s output fell by around a third year on year in each of June, July and August. Market prices then rose steadily, leading to the restart orders described at the start of this article.
The restart drive, signalled by the Taiyuan meeting, brought further controls. Through December, mines in Shanxi that pass a safety assessment may produce at one-twelfth of their approved annual capacity per month, after earlier over-production has been penalised (!). The meeting called for output to return to “normal levels” and for daily production monitoring, but did not specify whether individual mines had received fixed tonnage targets. Mine managers remain dependent on the officials who approve restarts, monitor output and can order closures.
This system creates an information problem. The plan sets production obligations from above, while detailed knowledge of costs, geology and safety rests with producers. Each level therefore has an incentive to report less capacity and more obstacles. China has seen the consequences before: chronic coal shortages were a feature of the planned economy in the 1980s, a pattern the Hungarian economist János Kornai described as an “economy of shortage”.
The question today is whether a similar dynamic can emerge within a market that still uses prices, contracts and spot trading. To answer it, we need to look at the incentives facing individual mine operators.
At 1,000 yuan a tonne, the market is asking Shanxi’s mines for more coal. Three features of the rules push the other way, and lead to less coal than the price would call for.
The first is safety. Mine managers answer to two hard accountability rules, one for shortages and one for accidents. Accidents weigh more directly, because an accident can be traced to a specific mine and its managers, while a shortage can be blamed on weather, imports, railways or demand. Safety also has a cost. Part of Shanxi’s low production cost has rested on “common” practices that break the rules: at Liushenyu, investigators found suspected hidden working faces and two tunnels missing from the mine’s drawings, and of the 247 people underground at the time of the explosion, the posted list showed only 124, while 103 workers (with informal contracts) were not wearing location cards. Strict enforcement removes that cost advantage. Under strict safety rules, the author believes that a contract price of about 700 yuan no longer covers the cost of the marginal tonne for many mines, so they produce less.
The second is the so-called ratchet effect, named after Martin Weitzman’s 1980 paper on Soviet planning: when this year’s performance sets next year’s target (or is at least positively correlated), a good year is punished with a harder target. Suppose an extra tonne sells at 1,000 yuan today, but half a tonne is added to next year’s contract obligation at 700 yuan. Ignoring discounting, that tonne is worth 850 yuan dynamically to the mine, not 1,000:
1,000 − 0.5 × (1,000 − 700) = 850
The rule cuts the effective price by 15%, and the cut grows as the gap between spot and contract prices widens. The ratchet therefore gives mines a reason to produce less than the spot price suggests.
The third is arbitrage between the two tracks. Jiahua Che and Giovanni Facchini showed in a 2007 paper that when the state’s control is incomplete, producers shift sales across time and between tracks, which can destroy the “no losers” property and part of the efficiency gain. In China, this has shown up as late or partial delivery on term contracts, and as lower-grade coal shipped under them while better coal goes to the spot market. Arbitrage does not reduce output as such; it moves coal away from the contract track, which is why NDRC now polices monthly fulfilment rates.
Taken together, these rules are expected to make a slow restart, careful documentation and output kept below every cap the safest choice for a Shanxi mine manager. Managing obligations pays better than chasing the spot price.
This has a climate effect. A carbon price works by raising the cost of the next tonne of coal for whoever decides whether to burn it. China’s coal plan does something by another route: the buyer at the margin faces a high spot price, delivery shortfalls or rationing, so coal becomes scarcer and dearer in real terms even while the nominal contract price stays flat. The 2026 data point is in this direction. National raw coal output fell 3.3% in January–August, and in August thermal power fell 4.3% year on year while wind output rose 7.9% and solar 10.3%; coal imports, the usual safety valve, fell about 6% in September. These figures cannot separate the plan’s effect from other factors, e.g. weak demand and a cool summer, but they are consistent with it.
China’s coal plan can work as a quasi-climate policy if three links in a chain hold.
Incentive incompatibility keeps supply below demand. As long as contract prices sit below the cost of safe, rule-compliant mining and obligations ratchet up with output, mines hold back. This link comes from the plan itself, and it is strong today.
Scarcity reaches the side of burning coal. If power tariffs stay regulated, generators absorb higher coal costs, lose money and keep burning. The climate effect appears only when costly coal shifts dispatch toward wind, solar and hydro, or pushes industrial users to cut their use.
The central government does not cure the shortage with new capacity. In 2021–2022, scarcity was answered by approving new mine capacity that will produce for decades (so-called “committed”). The emergency-supply mines named in Taiyuan, and the capacity reserve built since 2024, could repeat that and turn a short-term cap into long-term lock-in.
Albertans have chosen to stay in Canada, and the argument over who benefits from the province’s oil and gas will carry on inside the federation. As of late October/November, the market itself remains volatile and uncertain. Shanxi’s miners, for their part, will go on balancing quotas, prices and safety, and have to ask: whether to game the market or, increasingly, to game the rules?
The coal that this balancing leaves in the ground may turn out to be one of China’s least intended, and least noticed, contributions to climate action. This assumes growing value as demand-side carbon pricing loses political momentum worldwide.
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