The energy security lesson Europe learned from Ukraine – and may relearn in Hormuz

When climate policy became energy security policy

For much of the past two decades, renewable energy has been promoted primarily as a response to climate change. Advocates highlighted emission reductions, while critics frequently questioned the costs, intermittency, and reliability of wind and solar power. Energy security was often treated as a separate discussion, focused on pipelines, import terminals, storage facilities, and diplomatic relationships with producing countries.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine changed that perception almost overnight.

As Russian gas supplies disappeared from European markets and prices surged to unprecedented levels, policymakers found themselves confronting a reality that had received surprisingly little attention during earlier energy debates. Every unit of electricity generated from wind and solar was not merely reducing carbon emissions; it was also reducing the need to purchase natural gas at record prices from increasingly uncertain international markets.

The International Energy Agency estimated that the record 50 GW of wind and solar added in the EU in 2022 avoided the need for approximately 11 billion cubic metres of natural gas in the power sector – the single largest structural driver of reduced gas demand that year. While governments were negotiating LNG contracts and competing for cargoes on global markets, thousands of wind turbines and solar panels were quietly contributing to Europe's resilience. They did not solve the crisis, but they significantly reduced its severity.

This represented a subtle but important shift in the way renewable energy should be understood. What had long been viewed primarily as climate infrastructure suddenly revealed itself as security infrastructure as well.

The Dutch dilemma that never fully materialised

Nowhere was this dynamic more visible than in the Netherlands.

At the very moment Europe was desperately seeking alternatives to Russian gas, the Netherlands was moving toward the closure of one of Europe's largest gas fields. The Groningen field had supplied energy to the Dutch economy and large parts of Northwest Europe for decades, yet its future was increasingly overshadowed by the earthquakes and societal disruption associated with continued production.

What makes Groningen particularly interesting is that the field was not approaching exhaustion. Large quantities of gas remained underground. The decision to close the field was fundamentally a political and social one rather than a geological one. Dutch society had reached the conclusion that the costs imposed on local communities outweighed the benefits of continued extraction.

Had the Ukraine crisis occurred a decade earlier, before the rapid expansion of renewable energy across the Netherlands and Europe, that decision would almost certainly have faced much greater scrutiny. Faced with soaring gas prices, tightening supplies, and concerns about energy security, political pressure to expand Groningen production would likely have been significantly stronger.

Instead, the Netherlands found itself in a position where growing renewable generation reduced some of that pressure. Offshore wind farms in the North Sea, expanding solar capacity, and broader European renewable deployment helped reduce gas demand precisely when gas had become Europe's most strategically sensitive fuel.

The choice was never between renewables and Groningen. Yet renewable energy helped make it possible to maintain the Groningen closure without creating an even larger security challenge elsewhere.

From Russian pipelines to Gulf shipping lanes

The geopolitical landscape has evolved considerably since 2022, but Europe's exposure to international energy markets remains.

The recent tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz illustrate how quickly energy security concerns can re-emerge. Although diplomatic efforts have reduced immediate risks, uncertainty surrounding shipping through the Gulf continues to influence global energy markets. This matters because roughly one-fifth of global LNG trade passes through the strait, including much of the LNG exported by Qatar, one of Europe's most important suppliers since the reduction of Russian imports.

In many ways, Europe has solved one vulnerability by creating another. Russian pipeline gas has largely been replaced by LNG imports sourced from a more diverse group of suppliers. This diversification has undoubtedly improved resilience, but it has also increased Europe's dependence on maritime supply chains and global LNG markets.

The result is that a disruption in the Persian Gulf can now influence European energy security almost as directly as events in Eastern Europe once did.

Should restrictions or instability in Hormuz persist, LNG markets would tighten, prices would increase, and competition for available cargoes would intensify. Europe would once again be reminded that energy systems built around imported fuels inevitably remain exposed to geopolitical developments far beyond their borders.

The strategic value of not needing fuel

The experience of both Ukraine and Hormuz points toward a broader lesson that is often overlooked in energy policy discussions.

Governments traditionally seek security by diversifying suppliers. If one producer becomes unreliable, another can take its place. If one route becomes vulnerable, alternative infrastructure can be developed. Such strategies remain necessary and valuable.

However, they do not fundamentally eliminate dependence.

A different approach is to reduce the need for imported fuels altogether.

This is where renewable energy occupies a unique position. Wind turbines do not depend on tanker traffic through Hormuz. Solar panels are unaffected by sanctions, geopolitical disputes, or interruptions to maritime trade. Their output may vary with weather conditions, but their fuel source cannot be embargoed, weaponised, or withheld by a foreign government.

The Ukraine crisis revealed the practical implications of this reality. Every additional megawatt-hour of renewable electricity reduced exposure to gas markets. Every wind farm and solar installation lowered the volume of fuel Europe needed to import. In effect, renewable energy acted as a hedge against geopolitical risk.

What is particularly remarkable is that much of this strategic value emerged as a by-product of policies originally designed to reduce emissions.

A different way of thinking about the energy transition

The debate surrounding the energy transition often focuses on distant targets and long-term climate objectives. Net-zero commitments, decarbonisation pathways, and future temperature scenarios dominate much of the discussion.

Yet recent events suggest that some of the most important benefits of renewable energy are already being realised.

The transition is not simply preparing Europe for a future low-carbon economy. It is also helping Europe navigate an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment today.

This does not imply that renewable energy alone can eliminate energy security concerns. Europe will continue to require gas, electricity interconnections, storage facilities, and diversified supply chains for many years to come. Nor does it mean that geopolitical risks have disappeared.

What it does suggest is that the traditional distinction between climate policy and security policy is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

The Ukraine crisis demonstrated that renewable energy can reduce the impact of a major supply shock. The uncertainty surrounding Hormuz may soon provide another reminder. In both cases, the central lesson remains the same: the most secure unit of imported fuel is the one that never needed to be imported in the first place.

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