· 3 min read
The first two decades of the twenty-first century — marked by economic crises, pandemics, and great-power rivalries — strongly evoke the early years of the twentieth.
In his “cliodynamic” model, Peter Turchin argues that societies move through phases of expansion and crisis in cycles lasting roughly a century and a half. The twentieth century represented the peak of an expansive phase, followed by wars and collapses; today, indicators of polarisation, inequality, and international tension show a strikingly similar trajectory. Paul Kennedy, for his part, identified the erosion of dominant powers and the growing weight of military expenditure as precursors to systemic upheaval.
Then, as now, the world is witnessing the relative decline of a hegemon. In 1910, Britain accounted for about 25% of global GDP; by 1930, that share had fallen below 15%, while the United States and Germany were gaining ground. According to the International Monetary Fund, America’s share of global GDP (in purchasing power parity terms) declined from 30% in 2000 to 24% in 2024, while China’s rose from 4% to 19%. Bilateral trade between the two countries, worth less than 120 billion dollars in 2001, exceeded 800 billion in 2022 — but mutual dependence is now increasingly viewed as a strategic vulnerability. With India’s rise, moreover, history dynamics can no longer be seen as an exclusively Western affair.
Between 1870 and 1913, the “golden age” of free trade saw world commerce reach 55% of global GDP. After 1914, war and protectionism sharply reduced its weight. Today, after three decades of hyper-globalisation (1990–2008), the trend is reversing: according to the World Bank, the share of international trade in global GDP fell from 61% in 2008 to 56% in 2023. Supply chains are shortening, economies are becoming increasingly “regionalised”, and the language of cooperation is giving way to that of insecurity.
Technology is the great accelerator. Just as radio and cinema were powerful tools of modernity and propaganda, in the twenty-first century the digital revolution and artificial intelligence play a similar role — but on a global scale. According to NATO StratCom, online disinformation campaigns increased by more than 400% between 2014 and 2020: information, like energy or semiconductors, has become a geopolitical weapon.
On the domestic front, economic historian Branko Milanović notes that both in the 1920s and the 2010s, inequality reached record highs. In the United States, the richest 1% now hold around 20% of national income — a proportion comparable to that of the pre-1929 era. As then, the concentration of wealth fuels social tensions, populism, and a deepening mistrust of democratic institutions.
The Varieties of Democracy Institute records a marked decline in liberal democracies: from 41 in 2010 to 32 in 2020. At the same time, according to the Edelman Trust Barometer, public confidence in governments dropped by more than ten points following the pandemic. This too echoes the aftermath of 1918, when the Spanish flu and economic dislocation fostered political disillusionment and the search for authoritarian alternatives.
And yet, history never repeats itself exactly. Today’s world possesses nuclear deterrence, global networks, and multilateral institutions that make another 1914 highly improbable. Still, the structural mechanisms — the decline of the hegemon, the rise of rivals, and the fracture between elites and the masses — remain strikingly familiar.
For Turchin, societies do not learn; they are destined to complete each new cycle. One can only hope that we will prevent history — once again — from turning into a global tragedy.
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