A critical study on Nigeria's Petroleum Industry Act 2021


· 18 min read
The oil and gas industry plays a significant role in the development of the economy of Nigeria, both in terms of revenue generation and commercial viability. Although, the industry contributes about 90% of the foreign exchange earnings and 60% of total income. Consequently, any adverse change in the industry will have a striking and long-term impact on government finances and commercial arrangements in the country. As a result of this, successive governments have remained focused on the sector amidst various discussions on economic diversification. For the past twenty (20) years, there have been various attempts at reforming the oil and gas industry. However, none of these efforts have yielded any tangible result until the introduction of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) in the Third Quarter of 2021. The new law offers a radical departure from past norms as it ultimately transforms the oil and gas industry in Nigeria.
Among other things, the Act provides for:
The underlying issues of this Act during its deliberation phase as a bill have, upon its passage into law, been fully developed.
Amongst others, the new issues from the PIA include;
The PIA unlike previous legislations on the regulation of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria created a host community development trust. This provision is a major controversial issue because the host community has disagreed with the 3% derivation in the trust to the communities. This issue was a major delay in the signing of the bill into law. The 3% is considered a fair percentage to the government and foreign oil companies; the host communities are however demanding for a larger percentage. Host communities were not expressly defined under the Act and this is a cause for concern because the standards for selecting a host community is not stated. So, there is a lacuna in the definition of a host community; is any community where midstream oil and gas operations are held a host community? This is a question the Act failed to address.
Another look at the 3% fund for host communities means each host community gets 3% of operating expenses of an oil company, and the fund is given by the operators and not the government. One major rationale to the disapproval of the 3% derivation is because of the federal revenue allocation which is not often time advantageous to host communities, section 43(3) of the Constitution vests all oil in Nigeria in the federation. In Nigeria the issue on revenue allocation was brought to light in the case of AG Federation V AG Abia and Others, where the littoral states contended that their territory extended offshore as far as the continental shelf. Therefore, they laid claim to natural resources derivable from their territorial waters (relying on Section 4 of the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account) Act). Similarly In South Atlantic Petroleum Ltd v. Minister of Petroleum Resources the court held that petroleum resources in Nigeria are vested in the Federal Government.
The NUPRC is expected to promote and develop the exploration of frontier basins and according to Section 9(4) of the Act, a Frontier exploration Fund which shall be 30% of NNPC’s profit which will be maintained exclusively for the exploration of frontier basins. According to the NNPC, they said we have about six basins: Chad Basin, the Sokoto Basins, Benue Trough, the Bida Basins, Kolmani River II Well on the Upper Benue Trough, Gongola Basin in the North-Eastern part of the country, Anambra basin, Borno Chad basin, Dahomey basin. amongst others. Currently, crude oil is obtained from eight states in the Niger Delta region which include: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States. The Act does not exactly define what a frontier basin is or where it is located. Thus, it can be said that there is actually no exploration fund and thus the provision in the Act is suspected to be a means to an end for corruption.
It is ascertained that this allocation comes with its benefits and some of them include:
Whatever has benefits must also have disadvantages, thus the disadvantages of the allocation to frontier basins are highlighted below:
First, achieving environmental justice for pollution impacted communities goes beyond having a restoration fund known as “host communities development trust” under Section 235 of the PIA. A safe, healthy and good environment is a fundamental right of communities. Environmental disputes are inevitable due to the nature of oil exploration activities. It is sad that oil producing states are the ones that bear the brunt of most of the outcomes of these activities. Oil spill is a major basis for environmental disputes in the Nigerian oil and gas industry and they are quite predominant. A direct result of these oil spills and environmental problems is inflicted on the host communities. The host communities of the oil companies in Nigeria are faced with continued flaring of gas and its attendant consequences on the human habitat. There is in turn, inadequate compensation for the negative consequences of oil exploration activities, hence disputes continue to rise between host communities and oil companies in Nigeria.
It should be noted however, that environmental disputes often involve technical issues and multiple parties, thus making them quite difficult to tackle. The 3% allocated to the host communities by the Act is not enough considering the enormous environmental damage caused by oil exploration in the Niger Delta region. Sustainable local community development is beneficial to the profitability of the extractive industry and should be an important goal in the exploitation of extractive resources in Nigeria.
On this point, effective dispute resolution is deemed to be the most appropriate method through which host communities can seek redress for environmental disputes. Based on the premise that judgment obtained from the Nigerian courts rarely provide closure for host communities in oil and gas dispute, ADR is conceived as the most preferable dispute resolution mechanism, noteworthy because—as experts would note “ADR offers a resolution process that has a human face; that is not only concerned about the verdict but also pays greater attention to the feelings of both parties at the end of resolution.” In fact, key stakeholders in the industry affirm that the intervention of ADR will reduce the level of animosity that has existed as a result of past judgments by the courts.
The proposed means of alternative dispute resolution in this case is arbitration. There are three reasons why this is so peculiar for the Nigerian Oil and Gas industry.
Thus, this militates against litigation which is arguably often expensive, time consuming, adversarial and destructive of good relationships. It should be noted that the PIA advocates for arbitration in the absence of any agreement for dispute resolution by parties. A recent case to buttress this notion, is the international arbitration filed at the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against Shell regarding an oil spill that occurred five decades ago (during the Biafran civil war 1960-67) in the Ejama-Ebubu community. This arbitration took fifty (50) years of unsuccessful appeals until an arbitration award, which requires Shell to pay the aggrieved community $111 million was granted.
As stated earlier, the administration of the petroleum and energy sector in Nigeria has an integral role to play in providing adequate compensation and reliefs to host communities. Having identified, the two major controversial issues surrounding the decrease of allocation to host communities from 10% to 3% despite a proposed 5%, and the allocation of 30% to frontier basins, it is important to examine the practice in other jurisdictions, not only for the sake of comparison, but also as a starting point for proffering viable recommendations.
In the United States of America, there is a system of compensating oil producing states. This system is enforced by not only allocating funds to these oil producing states, but also imposing additional taxes on the properties and equipment used by companies in the process of exploration. It is observed from research that additional revenue has been generated via royalties paid based on the value of oil and gas produced from these regions which have led to a series of conflicts between the inhabitants of these regions, the exploration companies and the State. These monies generated are directed towards building schools, roads, and an overall improvement of infrastructure.
In North Dakota, USA, the State Government allocates a substantial amount of oil and gas revenue to trust funds to public education. In 2012 about $329 million was generated from leases granted by the state to oil and gas companies. Another set of countries including Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, India, and the United Arab Emirates collect substantial revenues directly from oil, gas or mining companies. Direct tax collection from the natural resource sector can constitute a significant proportion of local budgets. For example, from 2012 to 2014 more than 25 percent of all fiscal revenues collected in Alberta, Canada came from direct petroleum taxation. In the United States, severance taxes from the oil sector in 2014 constituted 72 percent of total fiscal revenues in Alaska, 54 percent in North Dakota, and 39 percent in Wyoming.
With the revamp of the petroleum sector in Nigeria via the newly enacted Act, one would expect that the new agencies and departments that are established would prioritize the advancement host communities by being specific and transparent about their flow of allocations, and the judicial and quasi-judicial penalties/liabilities should be stringent enough to upholding the standards of modern commercialization, environmental
impacts of petroleum exploration and the development of the oil producing regions, however, this is not the case as it seems the Act has killed the dreams of these host communities before their advancement can come into light.
In addition, and pertaining to oil and gas revenue, Angola, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada (some regions), Chad, China, Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, South Sudan, Uganda, and Venezuela each have enacted a 'derivation- based’ intergovernmental transfer system for all or part of their mineral, oil or gas revenues. In a majority of these countries, revenues from the oil, gas and mineral sectors are collected by the national government and transferred back to their area of origin or adjacent areas. A few countries transfer some of their natural resource revenues to subnational governments using an ‘indicator-based’ formula. In these countries, the national government distributes natural resource revenues to subnational authorities based on a set of objective indicators such as population, revenue generation, poverty level or geographic characteristics, irrespective of where the natural resources are extracted. Ecuador, Mongolia, Mexico and Uganda are examples of countries which use indicator-based resource revenue sharing formulas.
This paper has given an in-depth analysis of the newly enacted Petroleum Industry Act and the issues emanating from some of its provisions that have generated quite some controversies in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The allocation of 3% to host communities that suffer the direct consequences of oil exploration activities is considered unfair as against the allocation of 30% to frontier basin states. It is observed that the intent of these provisions, whatever they may be, are indeed myopic in light of the trend of energy transition in the industry both locally and internationally. In addition, the paper benchmarks the provisions of the newly enacted PIA with other socio-legal practices of petroleum sectors in foreign jurisdiction in order to gain experience and lessons for the Nigerian oil and gas industry. Furthermore, this paper has given a succinct legal opinion on how host communities can seek redress for environmental matters via arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution. In its concluding section, this paper has provided viable recommendations and strategies that can be applied in solving the controversial issues raised.
Future Thought Leaders is a democratic space presenting the thoughts and opinions of rising Energy & Sustainability writers, their opinions do not necessarily represent those of illuminem.
https://www.opml.co.uk/blog/nigerian-petroleum-industry-governance-bill
https://www.manifieldsolicitors.com/2021/09/16/highlights-of-the-petroleum-industry-act-2021/
https://home.kpmg/ng/en/home/insights/2021/06/petroleum-industry-bill-pib-2020.html
Agribusiness and Applied Economics Report No. 766 May 2017: Petroleum Industry’s Economic Contribution to North Dakota in 2015.
Fiscal Federalism of Non-Renewable Natural Resources: Principles and Practices of Revenue Sharing and Equalization by Baoyun Qiao, Anwar Shah & Grant Bishop
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